Last year Julian Heicklen was
arrested under 18 USC 1504, which has been interpreted by prosecutors as
criminalizing advocacy for jury nullification. After discussing the facts and
the relevant law, I offer two arguments. First, I use Brandenburg v. Ohio to argue that the statute violates the First
Amendment facially. Second, I use United
States v. Stevens to argue that the statute is overbroad as written and as
interpreted.
Facts
Julian
Heicklen is a retired chemistry professor at the great Penn State University.
Over the past few years, Heicklen
has stood outside the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York holding
a sign which reads ‘Jury Info’. He would also hand out brochures to passers
by advocating that jurors may acquit those charged with breaking laws which the
individual juror finds immoral or wrong. It is important to note that neither
Heicklen nor the government has alleged that Heicklen had any knowledge if any
passersby were jurors not that he targeted jurors in his advocacy in any way.
He simply offered information for anyone who approached him.
In
the federal system, jurors take an oath to decide the case in front of them “upon the law and the
evidence”, which has been interpreted as constraining jurors from acting on
disagreement with the underlying law itself. As such, taking the morality of
the law itself into account when judging an accused’s guilt or innocence, it is
argued, would be a violation of the juror oath, and thus a violation of federal
law. So jury nullification has been a controversial issue in United States
jurisprudence because it is seen by some as advocating jurors to violate the
law. The federal prosecutors charged Heicklen with violating 18 USC 1504, which
reads:
Whoever attempts to influence the action or decision of any
grand or petit juror of any court of the United States upon any issue or matter
pending before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a member, or
pertaining to his duties, by writing or sending to him any written
communication, in relation to such issue or matter, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the
communication of a request to appear before the grand jury.
In November
2010, under this premise, federal
prosecutors charged Heicklen with attempting to influence jurors.
The statute, as applied, is a prima facie violation of the
First Amendment.
The First Amendment to
the Constitution states, in relevant part, “Congress shall make no law…
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble...”
A
test of this language came in 1969 when the U.S. Supreme Court was presented
with an appeal by a KKK member who spoke at the group’s march. He stated, inter
alia, “…it's possible that there might have to be some revengeance [sic]
taken.” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 446 (U.S. 1969). He went on to vow that the organization will march on
Congress and several cities in Florida and Mississippi. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444 at 446. Because of his speech, he was
convicted of radical syndicalism under an Ohio statute. Id. The Court held that the state cannot proscribe mere “advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action”. Id. at 447.
Finding that this statute proscribed mere advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation, the Court overturned the conviction.
While jurors do swear to decide the
case "upon the law and the evidence", it remains unsettled whether
jury nullification is a violation of the federal juror’s oath. Jury Handbook. If
jury nullification is illegal this renders Heicklen an advocate of lawlessness.
Even so, the statue in question, 18 USC 1504, makes no reference to imminency
nor likelihood of the production of such action. The government makes no claim
that Heicklen bases his appearances on the court’s docket and alleges no
targeting of jurors when he avails literature. Moreover, the government makes
no claim he advocates jurors decide a particular way in any specific case. Here,
Heicklen merely provided literature for passersby, he did not attempt to
produce imminent lawless action, nor is he likely to produce such an action. As
such, Heicklen is directing his advocacy at the general attitude of possible
law violation, as he aims at no particular issue or case.
Under the test written in
Brandenburg, it is clear that Heicklen engaged in mere advocacy of a political
and legal issue. As this statute is presently construed to proscribe such
action, it state no requirement that such advocacy produce imminent lawlessness
nor have any likelihood to incite such action. As such, 18 USC 1504 is a clear
prime facie violation of the First Amendment to the Constitution at interpreted
in Brandenburg.
The statue is constitutionally overbroad.
In
First Amendment litigation, a statute must be narrowly tailored so as to not
criminalize constitutionally protected speech. Specifically, a statute is
overbroad if “a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional,
judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.” Washington
State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449
(2008). To discern whether a statute is overbroad, then, a court must determine
the range of what is proscribed under it. United
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293,
(2008).
In
U.S. v. Stevens, the Supreme Court
was presented with a challenge to 18 USC 48, which criminalized the commercial
creation, sale or possession of depictions of animal cruelty. United
States v. Stevens, 130 S.
Ct. 1577 (U.S. 2010). In that case, Stevens argued that the statute covered a
depictions a large amount of legal activity, and as such was overbroad. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 at 1587. The
Court agreed.
In Julian Heicklen’s
case, 18 USC 1504 reads, in part, “Whoever attempts to influence the action or
decision of any… juror… upon any issue or matter pending before such juror… by
writing or sending to him any written communication, in relation to such issue
or matter, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned...” Here, holding a
sign and offering pamphlets is considered ‘sending written communication’.
Moreover, the prosecutor’s office has stated, “advocacy
of jury nullification, directed as it is to jurors, would be both criminal and
without Constitutional protections no matter where it occurred.” Under the
wording of 18 USC 1504 and the government’s construction of it, if any person
hands out literature on any matter before any juror who may be passing by, that
person is subject to criminal penalty. The statute does not require that the
communication be knowingly or reasonably calculated to be received by a juror,
nor does it require likelihood that such communication could influence a juror.
Moreover, the government’s argument that Heicklen’s actions would be criminal
“no matter where it occurred” is deeply troubling. This argument necessarily
holds that no place in the United State is safe to publish or write about jury
nullification, as it may be possible that a current juror could read it, and
thus be influenced on a matter pertaining to his or her duty. An outright ban
on the publication and distribution of points of view on important political
and judicial matters is exactly the type
of government action the Constitutional Framers sought to prohibit when
adding the First Amendment to the Constitution.
As
18 USC 1504—under the government’s interpretation—criminalizes any written
communication about jury nullification which may end up in the hands of a
potential juror, it is clear it proscribes constitutionally protected speech.
This is irrespective of the intent, reasonable expectations, or location of the
writer. This statute and the conviction of Julian Heicklen under it are
unconstitutional.
Conclusion
The Founding Generation of the
United States found itself in possession of the political unpopular viewpoint
in favor of independence of the colonies from Britain. That is the context in
which the First Amendment was born—a desire for freedom of political speech and
expression. Indeed, in the marketplace of ideas, the ability to freely express
one’s self is the first step toward discovering political truth. Indeed the
Supreme Court has held that political expression holds a preferred position in
First Amendment litigation due to this foundational American belief. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943).
Above it is argued that the 18 USC
1504, by proscribing mere advocacy, is a plain violation of the First Amendment
and long-established precedent. Moreover, the government’s interpretation of
the statute covers an overly broad range of constitutionally protected speech.
Lastly, expression like Julian Heicklen’s is so constitutionally important that
precedent has limited all three branches of government on proscribing it.
In the final analysis, the
prosecutor here is targeting Heicklen merely because the government disagrees
with Heicklen’s position on the controversial issue of jury nullification. The
government feels threatened by the idea itself, and as such wished to use
Heicklen as an example. It is clear that such viewpoint discrimination is
patently unconstitutional. R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). As such, there are no grounds upon which
Julian Heicklen’s conviction could be sustained. Both his arrest and 18 USC
1504, as interpreted, are unconstitutional.