Explaining America: #BlackLivesMatter and CIA Torture

One of the hats I wear is a teacher of English as a new language, mostly to new Americans. They all came here for a reason—for a better shot at happiness—and as such generally have a personal stake in the American Dream not only being a reality, but having room for them and their children, as well.

In order to present a full picture of the United States, however, I try to allow the students to draw their own conclusions from the country’s past: our relations with Native Americans, our Founding, our reactions to the various waves of immigrants, the history of slavery and its role in our governmental development, and the Women’s Rights, Civil Rights, and Gay Rights movements. The 2000 presidential election, for example, is a great lesson on our respect for governance institutions. I try to highlight the pressures and interests which explain what seems bad about American history and note the asterisks which often follow what seems good about American history.

In previous months, I have been asked questions which lead to teachable moments. An individual burning a Quran in Florida leads to a wonderful discussion of free speech and the path of 1^st Amendment litigation during the 20^th Century and where it stands today. A discussion on curbing climate change leads to a mention of the Kyoto Protocol, and therefore a lesson on the concept of dualism in international law. The controversies surrounding the Affordable Care Act can lead to an important lesson on federalism.

This past month has been different. Sure, the grand jury verdict regarding the death of Michael Brown led to a discussion about evidence and the presumption of innocence, but the verdict following the death of Eric Garner made the previous lesson feel hollow. Of course the CIA Torture Report can bring to the fore the separation of powers, but the existence of such programs which are so obviously “contrary to our values” is difficult to present in a non-judgmental way.

I love my country. I view America as a good literary protagonist: she has a complex past and she does make mistakes, but she’s affable and fundamentally good. These terrible news stories, however, have made explaining America more difficult and more troubling. Are Jim Crow and Korematsu really just skeletons in America’s closet, or are they examples of her deep flaws which she refuses to address? December 2014 suggests the latter.

The beauty and frustration of a federal republic is that no single institution can address these flaws alone. But America’s story is not over: We The People must actively engage in all levels of governance in order to write the chapter that we wish to read. Looking forward to 2015, I hope we write for America a better future, so when it eventually becomes the past itself, the job of explaining America will be an easy one.

Moral Relativism & US Public Diplomacy (revised)

This update of an older post was written for the Public Diplomat and can be found here.

As the science of morality progresses, US public diplomacy should educate others despite any cultural differences.

Since the Age of Exploration, the dominant views of Europeans toward people who populated the other continents were paternalistic and ethnocentric — to not be Europeans and Christian instantly diminished the worth of a person or a belief. Relatively recently, the prevailing view in Europe and the West has shifted to become more tolerant — perhaps in reaction to the brutality of past injustices. In the extreme this has led to moral relativism, a judgment-free approach toward the values of other cultures. At present this view is ubiquitous in anthropological and sociological literature. As a modern, accepting people, so the argument goes, we shall not narrow-mindedly impose our morals on others.

But this argument assumes that morality is a subjective notion, or that there is no objective measure by which one can judge others actions or values. The only reason these assumptions have not been effectively challenged, argues Sam Harris in his book The Moral Landscape, is because we have an underdeveloped science of morality. Harris makes a key point: unknown is not the same as unknowable. Just because we have yet to coalesce on a singular measure of objective moral judgment does not mean that we will not be able to do so in the future. In light of the history of scientific and rational progress, we cannot say that the fields of neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and anthropology will never advance and be able to determine that certain actions, beliefs and principles are objectively counter to human well-being.

Can one say that rights of self-governance are objectively morally good?  Can one say that deploring despotic rule is merely a subjective preference, based on little more than culturally arbitrary preferences? One’s answer to these questions is vital to one’s view of public diplomacy. If the answer is that there is no objective truth on such moral questions, then why should the American people try to influence other cultures with portraying our values of democracy and human rights? If it’s for mere economic gain, why not sell the beaches of Hawai’i instead of

democracy and human rights? Surely vacation destinations are far easier to sell in places like China. If public diplomacy only functions to serve our subjective national trade or diplomacy interests, should it be valued as a legitimate field, or simply method of propaganda?

I view public diplomacy more expansively. The message of public diplomacy, like any other communication, must come from our ‘mission statement’ — the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration tells a candid world with what rights all people[1] were born — not just Americans. It discusses why all governments are instituted—not just the U.S. government. These are statements claiming objective truth! As such, I argue that any U.S. public diplomacy which flows from our organizational mission statement cannot be morally relative. And while the science of morality is underdeveloped, that does not mean that nothing is known. Harris compares morality to health: just as we know that eating only marshmallows is less likely to lead to a healthy body than eating a diet which includes leafy green vegetables and protein, we also know that enslaving or subjugating women or whole ethnic groups are less likely to result in human flourishing than equal rights and opportunities for all. For these reasons, U.S. public diplomacy should not shy away from strongly holding any cultural or political practice as superior to those which we know are wrong — especially as science progresses to advance our knowledge and understanding on these points[2].

In a sense, U.S. public diplomacy should not narrowly seek to advance our economic interests, but instead promote values which are objectively aligned with the promotion of human well-being. And as our understanding of human happiness and well-being advances, the more we will know about the science of morality, and the better we can conduct our public diplomacy toward educating others. “What right does the West have to tell a conservative Islamic country that women should not wear the veil?” one might ask. Someday, perhaps as much right as one has to assert that the Earth is an oblate spheroid and revolves around the Sun, and anyone arguing the contrary is simply wrong.

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[1] I generally take “all men” to mean “all humans,” but even if Jefferson explicitly meant the male gender, the point still stands that it was meant universally to all men, not just American men.

[2] I don’t assume that the U.S. has any monopoly on objective morality. No study has shown that corporal punishment bestows any long-term benefit on any person, yet the U.S. stands as a country which frequently practices it. Science also requires flexibility and recalibration in the face of evidence.

The Obama Effect in the Arab World

This academic paper was written for the Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy. The PDF of the paper can be found here.


Abstract:

This paper tests the Obama Effect hypothesis with respect to the Arab World. The paper first presents the popular uses of the term and then discusses the thin scholarly literature on the topic. For quantitative data, the paper uses longitudinal data from the Annual Public Opinion Poll from 2004 to 2011, with supplemental data from the Pew Research Center. Furthermore, the paper analyzed data on the Arab Spring in the context of a possible Obama Effect and policy implications for the future of U.S. foreign policy. The paper found insufficient support for the hypothesis due to a lack of theoretical foundation or statistical support in the Arab world. It should be noted that this study was limited due to the lack of survey questions tailored to test this specific hypothesis. Lastly, the paper made suggestions for future U.S. foreign policy in the Arab world as well as for future research.

How Hillary Clinton Democratized Diplomacy One Tweet at a Time

This post on the State Department's use of technology in pubic diplomacy can be found at PolicyMic.

As Hillary Clinton continues to recover from her health scare and prepares to return to work as Secretary of State, Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) is readying to succeed her at that position. And of course, questions remain about Clinton's intentions for a possible presidential run in 2016. But instead of peering forward, let us look back at how she has changed public diplomacy at the State Department.

Before Clinton arrived at State, the approach of U.S. public diplomacy was to "sell" the U.S. The goal was more analogous to marketing: to paint the U.S. in a positive light through commercials and other media campaigns. These actions, however, are only one-way: yelling at the television does not constitute a conversation.

So when Clinton arrived, she embraced 21st Century Statecraft: diplomacy through any technological means. Clinton brought on board technological innovators, such as Alec Ross, to change how America communicates with the world. The State Department now has hundreds of social media accounts, from Twitter to Facebook and from YouTube to Google+. Both individuals and agencies within the State Department have specialized accounts, and many operate in important and popular languages around the world. Under Clinton the approach of U.S. public diplomacy went from marketing to engagement. In a study under review at the Journal of Public Relations Research (entitled "A Social Networks Approach to Public Relations on Twitter: Social Mediators and Mediated Public Relations") Himelboim, I., Golan, G.J., Moon, B. and I have found that the State Department successfully uses Twitter to establish two-way symmetrical relationships with their publics.

In other terms, by embracing new technological innovations in the context of a traditional bureaucratic structure, Clinton has democratized diplomacy. Around the world foreign publics can now converse and interact with the State Department on their mobile phone, tablet, or computer in their native language. They only need internet access and a social media account. Have you ever sent an email, Tweet, or complaint to a faceless organization, only to be pleasantly surprised at receiving a real response? Anyone who has knows first-hand the difference between marketing and engagement. Public diplomacy, among other things, is a tool of what I call preventative national security: responding to the grievances of those who feel slighted by America before they become radicalized and violent.

Like any other approach this engagement model of public diplomacy is not perfect, and as such must be used alongside broadcast media approaches to public diplomacy and traditional diplomacy, as well. But Hilary Clinton's embrace of new technology to institutionalize conversations between the State Department and foreign publics around the world will build relationships and help shape America's image abroad for generations to come. Because while a commercial can last only thirty seconds, a relationship can last a lifetime. 

Election 2012: Top 5 Middle East Challenges the Next President Will Face

I wrote a quick list of the top 5 challenges for the US in the Middle East. You can find my post on PolicyMic.com here.

No matter who wins the presidential election, there will be a whole slew of Middle East challenges for either Obama or Romney to face. Here are the top five challenges facing the President of the United States.

1. Political Islam

Presidents of both parties have spoken of democracy in the Middle East as an important goal of U.S. foreign policy. During the Bush years, the prospect of holding elections in Iraq and Gaza were met eagerly by the White House. However, for some reason the results were surprising to the administration: when a group of people who generally hold religion as very important in their lives and central to their identities vote, their votes are informed by religion. Who would’ve thought?

During the Arab Spring, oppressive leaders such as Hosni Mubarak, Muammar Gaddafi, Ben Ali, and Ali Abdullah Saleh fell, and elections followed suit. The big winners have been groups like Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood — Islamist parties. While we should not be too optimistic about the prospects of democracy in all of these countries just yet, some news out of places like Tunisia and Egypt show that elected leaders are beginning to behave like democratic politicians by pandering to their constituencies.

Of course, these groups have made U.S. policymakers nervous in the past. But a functioning U.S. foreign policy will have to learn to be tolerant of these groups going forward. If the U.S. truly values the proliferation of democracy throughout the world, our foreign policy must be able to work with those officials who are popularly elected by their people.

2. Public Diplomacy

For more than 10 years now, Americans have been asking with respect to the Middle East , "why do they hate us? Have we listened to any of the answers? 

Public opinion in the Middle East toward the U.S. is important for U.S. interests both with regards to foreign policy and national security. First, terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda still exist in places like Pakistan and Yemen. Ill-informed U.S. foreign policy only adds fuel to the fire of these groups. Improving how the U.S. is viewed in the region is a proactive approach to the problem of terrorism. Second, for the foreseeable future, unfortunately, America will continue to run on fossil fuels. As long as the global price of oil is directly or indirectly controlled by many in the Middle East, we have an interest to have positive views of the U.S. predominate in the Middle East. Lastly, if democracy does take hold in the region, increasingly politicians will not be willing to work with the U.S. if doing so would be used against them in the next election. If the people do not like us, their leaders will not be able to afford to either. 

While many policy choices of the past cannot be undone (read: the war in Iraq), continuing and emerging issues must be handled with care; such as the continued use of drone strikes and the existence of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay.

3. Pull out of Afghanistan

It seems that the candidates agree that U.S. forces should exit Afghanistan as early as 2014. That’s the easy part. The hard part is to do so responsibly and without creating more problems than we solved by going into Afghanistan over a decade ago.

For example, there have been recent reports noting that Afghan security forces are not yet ready for a U.S. withdrawal. Also, remember that the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is often an artificial line in the mountains for which many have little concern. Osama bin Laden was found in Pakistan, and Al Qaeda elements undoubtedly remain there. With Pakistan heading into elections in the coming months, we must work closely with Pakistan to try and create as stable an Afghanistan and Pakistan as possible before our troops leave the region.

Lessons must be learned from our drawdown from Iraq and U.S. national security and the security of the Afghan people must take priority over political capital. A quick aside: our veterans must be given better care and attention upon returning home — it’s quite literally the least we can do.

4. Iran

Iran’s nuclear ambitions are no secret, and have led the U.S. to impose crushing sanctions on the country. President Ahmadinejad has been heavily criticized within Iran for allowing the economy to slip, causing him to limp to the end of his presidency in June 2013. While the next U.S. president will have a new Iranian president with whom to work, little will likely change as Ayatollah Khamenei holds the real power in Iran. 

While there are important and provocative arguments supporting a nuclear Iran, such a position would be political suicide for an American president. Based on Iranian rhetoric on the matter, a nuclear Iran presents too great a feeling of insecurity for the U.S. and U.S. interests in the region, and the U.S. must stand by principles of nuclear non-proliferation. Of course, Israel’s Netanyahu has not made anything easier, either. Apreemptive strike by Israel would be irresponsible and dangerous for the entire region. 

In sum, the next president must do what is possible to promote dialogue between the two countries. The guiding principles of policy toward Iran should be peace and nuclear non-proliferation.

5. Syria

Syria appears to be the last major armed conflict of the Arab Spring — a conflict in which over 20,000 people have died. On the one hand it is hard to imagine a scenario in which the international community continues to tolerate President Assad as the leader of Syria. On the other, the stubborn Assad has no incentive to step down or flea. If he does, or is overthrown, there lingers the risk of a sectarian struggle in which the minority Alawi (which includes the Assad family) would be in grave danger.

While many across the world have called for some form of humanitarian intervention (perhaps similar to Libya), Russia has continued to block any authorization to act in the Security Council. While most Americans want the U.S. to do something in Syria to stop the violence, few Americans would stomach sending American troops into harm’s way for the cause. Last month Syria and Turkey exchanged shots across the border, possibly relating to the hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees in camps across the Turkish border. While unlikely, if Turkey were to invoke Article V of the NATO charter (used only once: in response to 9/11), the U.S. could get dragged into Syria regardless of the Security Council or U.S. public opinion.

Regardless of how the conflict ends, the real problems for the next president begin once the Assad regime falls. Syria is in possession of chemical and biological weapons, and if the government falls, those weapons could foreseeably fall into the wrong hands. A protracted, unstable Syria will put strain — in the form of refugees and border control — on countries like Lebanon and Iraq, countries that have enough problems of their own right now. Many of the issues discussed above, political Islam, regional stability, and weapons non-proliferation, all come to a head in how the next president must approach the evolving conflict in Syria.

Westboro Baptist Church and Innocence of Muslims: Why Even Offensive Speech Must Be Protected

This post on free speech was written for PolicMic.com and can be found here.

Last month’s violent reactions to the internet video Innocence of Muslims, created in the United States, should remind all Americans why we stand so firmly for free speech. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” While we have certainly transgressed from our ideals, we must strive to remain faithful to the Constitution in times of national stress. We are a diverse people who only have our founding documents — documents of laws and ideals — bind us together.

This legal tradition is best understood through some exemplar U.S. Supreme Court cases:

In the 1964 case New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court heard a defamation claim of a public individual regarding a public matter. Though the facts in question were indeed found to be false, Justice Brennan wrote, “Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”

The plaintiff lost.

In the 1969 case Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court was presented with a KKK member who, at a KKK rally, vowed that the organization would march on Congress and several cities in Florida and Mississippi. The Court held that the state cannot proscribe mere “advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Legally, ‘imminent’ means ‘right here, right now.'

In1992 (R.A.V. v. St. Paul) and 2003 (Virginia v. Black), the Court struck down statutes banning cross burning as a form of speech or expression.

Lastly, in 2011 the Court decided Snyder v. Phelps. Here, tort damages were sought against the Westboro Baptist Church for protesting at a soldier's funeral, spouting hate speech at the burial itself as well as on the Internet. The religious extremists stood across the street from the cemetery, holding signs which accused the fallen soldier of supporting homosexuals and claiming that he was going to hell for his acts. 

In an 8-1 decision, the majority held that the First Amendment protects those who stage peaceful protests near the funeral of a military service member from tort liability. The Court stated, “speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and — as it did here — inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course — to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”

It is this legal tradition which clearly states that our government is not allowed to make judgments on religious truth or falsity. That belongs to individuals to decide. ‘The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same’ is how American law understands freedom. An insulting and hateful video made in Florida does not impede individuals in London, Benghazi, Mogadishu, or Tokyo from practicing their religion; nor does it stop them from peacefully showing their displeasure.

Despite this, Jacqueline O’Rourke in "Innocence of America: orientalism, hooligans and radicals" on OpenDemocracy.net implies that the video Innocence of Muslims constitutes hate speech, is indicative of a larger Islamophobia in the West, and as such should be regulated.

However, R.A.V. v. St. Paul and Virginia v. Black show that our lack of hate speech protection regarding the controversial video has nothing to do with Islam — it has to do with liberty. It is true that Islam is disproportionately a target of criticism in the U.S, and this must be combated with education and cultural and public diplomacy efforts. However, it is not true that Islam should be immune from the most “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp” criticisms. All ideas should equally be subject to that treatment. This is how thoughts are to be tested, in the hot crucible of the marketplace of ideas.

Ms. O’Rourke speaks of an international social contract. I do agree that the international community is becoming increasingly interconnected, and that no nation (nor person) is an island. And I agree that when the idea of a Chinese scientist or inventor is suppressed in China, those in Italy have been precluded from the benefit of those ideas or discoveries. As such, this only supports the need for a vibrant free speech paradigm: there are so many ideas, and all publics must debate which ones are good, which ones are bad, and why. This may offend many people, but violence is not an acceptable reaction.

Erik Bleich's article, "How much free speech do we need?" on Al Jazeera English asks the reader to reconsider America’s outlying protection of free speech. Mr. Bleich cites Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952, wherein the Court upheld a statute which criminalized racially hateful publication, as an example of American speech restraint. While never explicitly overturned, this case has been rendered completely marginalized by all the cases I mention above.

Mr. Bleich points out that even Europe has more moderate speech regulations, and that a majority of Americans in fact support less extreme speech protections than American law presently upholds. It is a nuance of American democracy, however, that allows for the protection of the minority, even if that minority is a hateful, fundamentalist religious group which protests the funerals of those who bravely served our own country. This is where populism must give way to human rights. Otherwise, I certainly would be fearful in a legal system in which public opinion was used to determine fundamental rights.

People are perfectly free to feel hurt and disrespected. But such emotions don’t validate violent reaction. The power to violently censor people is the exact power that people like Qaddafi or Mubarak had. So we must first think of how our actions might prohibit truthful or helpful speech in the future. Even if a majority of us don’t like it, we must recognize that religious and political speech is of the utmost importance to our national and international discussions on these issues. Countless court cases have held that even when Americans are deeply offended and disrespected, our laws protect the speaker. If for no other reason, how is the government to know what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ on in political or religious arguments? Government is not in the business of determining truth or falsity — and it would do poor a job it if was.

We must continue to allow uninhibited, robust, and wide-open public debate on important issues. At times such debate may include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp criticisms of ideas or people. It may stir people to action, move them to tears, or inflict great pain. Public criticisms may be true or may be false, but that is not for our law or government to decide. Free speech is not a negative right: the government should protect the speaker against the heckler’s veto.

For in each of us lies the capacity to discuss and debate publicly and peacefully to help answer the great questions of our time.

Open Governance and Public Diplomacy

I wrote this blog for the Exchange website. You can find it here.

Beijing’s New Year’s Eve Diplomacy?

This year for our New Year’s Eve festivities, my girlfriend and I decided to finally go to Times Square to watch the ball drop. It was a lot of fun. However, I couldn’t help but see certain festivities in the light of public diplomacy.

To start, I’ll let the Times Square site describe the events:

Opening Ceremonies – Chinese Cultural Performance, Lion Dance

 The Sino-American Friendship Association (“SAFA”) presents a spectacular Chinese cultural performance of the Lion Dance to begin the Times Square New Year’s Eve celebration on the Nivea Countdown Stage at Duffy Island between 46th and 47th Streets. The Lion Dance is a popular Chinese New Year tradition bringing good luck in the upcoming year. The SAFA President, Peter Zhang and Executive Vice-President Li Li will be joined by Tim Tompkins, President of the Times Square Alliance to participate in the eye dotting ceremony that awakens the spirit of the Lion prior to the start of the Lion Dance. The Lion Dance will conclude with red and gold pyrotechnic effects atop One Times Square.

Before the performance and display, representatives from the Sino-American Friendship Association spoke of a desire for a strong friendship between China and the U.S., as well as China’s strong culture. Also representatives from the city of Beijing noted that Beijing and New York are sister cities, and spoke of the beauty and history of Beijing. Lastly, employees or volunteers of the Times Square Alliance handed out tourist maps of Beijing to the audience. I obviously had to grab one for research for this important blog post.

While I didn’t hear the group from Pittsburg in front, the group from Japan to the side, or the couple from Australia behind us say it, the whole time I was thinking, is this public diplomacy? It certainly felt like public diplomacy. However, it was presented as a collaboration between the tourism bureau of a city and a (presumably) non-profit organization, neither being a national government (of course I don’t know whether the Chinese national government was involved at all).

While I have discussed models of public diplomacy elsewhere, I think the question of whether this constitutes public diplomacy is unique. From the point of view of the SAFA, this is merely issue advocacy, at best cultural diplomacy. From the point of view of the government of Beijing, this is merely tourism advertising, at best public relations. While these things are all related to public diplomacy, they aren’t public diplomacy. But, does the label public diplomacy inherently depend on the intent of the utterer? Or, does it merely depend on the nature of the utterance? Or, even perhaps the point of view of the observers of the utterance?

Here, I think we have a coordinated effort by different entities which have different, but aligned, goals. The SAFA would like positive sentiments toward China and Chinese among Americans, while Beijing would like to increase the desire of Americans to visit Beijing and spend money in their city. Using the definition of public diplomacy I have used elsewhere (public diplomacy is the image of a state or its people, as maintained by a government, organization, or people, and held by international publics), both goals (positive sentiments and the desire to visit a foreign place) are clearly public diplomacy goals. To say that this utterance was outside the definition and scope of public diplomacy would be an artificially narrow conception of the idea.

Thus, I assert that in order for an action or utterance to be considered public diplomacy, the action or utterance itself must be coordinated and intentional, and have goals in line with the definition, concepts, and values of public diplomacy. The actor or utterer needn’t consciously decide to engage in public diplomacy as such, merely consciously decide to engage in actions which could reasonably be construed as public diplomacy. As such, the New Year's Eve actions and utterances by Beijing and the SAFA does constitute public diplomacy.

Thanks for reading. I’m wondering how much of all this was broadcast on TV or the internet? I’m wondering how many of you out there saw this and have thoughts about it. I look forward to your comments.

P.S. Chinese New Year is January 23^rd this year.

Part III: Short-term: Mediated public diplomacy

Introduction

Part I

Part II

Mediated public diplomacy is messaging, image control and relationship building through third-party media. This style of public diplomacy is effective, efficient, and greatly important in the Middle East and North Africa.     

First, it is important to note that the U.S. has established media in the Middle East and North Africa on which it can conduct public diplomacy; Radio Sawa and Al Hurra television. However, these media have little credibility in the region, and thus far have not improved views of America (el-Nawawy, 2006). Radio Sawa and Al Hurra continually ask people of the region to take the effort to listen or watch an American-sponsored medium, as opposed to a native medium. This is problematic when the audience may already be skeptical of, and experienced with, state-sponsored media and the U.S. in general. It would be much more reasonable to find the publics the U.S. wishes to reach where they already are: regional media.

Al Jazeera has emerged in as the most influence medium in the Middle East and North Africa. By simply being a satellite television station, Al Jazeera has already challenged the control on the flow of media that Arab states traditionally had (Lynch, 2006). It’s most popular format is the debate between strong advocates on either side of a sensitive topic. This is not only highly entertaining, but it has created a cultural acceptance for civic discussion and disagreement is a prerequisite for multiparty democracy. (Id.). Of course, as the Hostile Media Effect would predict, Al Jazeera has been charged as being a propaganda piece for everything from the West to al Qaeda. (Id.). The U.S. simply must be an active participant in this conversation. Al Jazeera, Al Arabia, and other regional networks garner the lion’s share of viewership in the region—and the U.S. must meet the publics where they are, not where the U.S. would like them to be. While quasi-independent regional media in no way suggests the sprouting of liberal democracies throughout the region, the cultural needs for acceptance of opposition and the desire to project political opinions may go a long way in establishing Arab democracy, which has been a long-time goal of the U.S (Lynch, 2006). The U.S. should support such media by buying ad space and sending guests to discuss, debate, and explain key aspects of American life and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa. This is mediated public diplomacy.

While mediated public diplomacy seeks to address the publics of the region where they already are viewers, it will require extensive training for the individuals who will appear on such programming. These media operate in local languages, such as Arabic, not in English. The subtleties of language and cultural must be understood in order to properly and accurately explain policies and values without mistake or misunderstanding. Indeed, those representing the U.S will likely be faced with antagonistic hosts and audience skepticism (Sheafer and Gabary, 2009). The best way to do this effectively would be to engage in extensive, regions-specific training and to utilize the diaspora communities already here in the U.S. This will show the publics of the  Middle East and north Africa that Americans care about learning their  language, culture,  and customs, and that their relatives here in the U.S. are appreciated, accepted, and represent America just as much as anyone else. Compared to the exchanges discussed above, the impact of mediated public diplomacy is largely short-term. Policy decisions can be explained quickly and as events unfold in the region.

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And in the end…

In this post series I recommended that the US Department of State concentrate new funding and resources on two areas, one long-term and one short-term. The long-term policy focus should be on sending Americans to the Middle East and North Africa to engage in educational exchanges as well as professional and development support. This will result in long-term relationships which will create benefits for years to come. The short-term policy focus should be on mediated public diplomacy: traditional public relations, crisis management and marketing of the United States by Americans on popular regional media. This will expose the publics of the region to U.S. policy explanations and Americans who know and understand their language and culture. While other current public diplomacy efforts in the region should be maintained, these foci present the U.S. with the most efficient forms of American advocacy in the Middle East and North Africa. Thanks for reading!

References

el-Nawawy, M. (2006) US public diplomacy in the Arab world: The news credibility of Radio Sawa and Television Alhurra in five countries. Global Media and Communication.

Lynch, M. (2006). Voices of the new Arab public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East politics today. New York. Columbia University Press

Sheafer, T. and Gabary, I. (2009) Mediated Public Diplomacy: A Strategic Contest over International Agenda Building and Frame Building. Political Communication.

Part II: Long-term: Exchange-based public diplomacy

Introduction

Part I

Exchanges between states have the greatest potential to create lasting relationships between people. While they often impact a limited number of people, the impact is real and can spread more reliably by word-of-mouth and peer-to-peer communication than mass messaging can. Exchange-based programs, then, focus more on depth than breadth. Traditionally exchanges most occur in the educations setting; high school and university students from the Middle East and North Africa would come to the U.S. for a period of time while our student would go to that region, as well. While both of these directions, a cash-strapped Department of State should concentrate more on sending American Students to the Middle East and North Africa than bringing their students here. While this may sound unbalanced, the reasons for this emphasis are sound.

First, when the U.S. sends an American abroad, that American will come into contact hundreds of citizens in the host state. Each citizen with which that student interacts will have meet an American, and would thus have first-hand experience of what an American is like and how Americans act. Each citizen may then communicate this experience to others, and such experiences will be trusted as genuine. In contrast, when those from abroad visit the U.S., they too come into contact with hundreds of Americans, none of whom are selected for any required cultural sensitivity of meeting an individual from the Middle East or North Africa. In the end, if any one of these interactions is unpleasant, it could sour the entire experience for our guest, as negative impressions have stronger impacts on the human mind than positive ones. Even if the experience is a positive one, when our guest returns home, there is only one person who has first-hand experiences with Americans. While the word-of-mouth transmission is the same, there are fewer sources in this scenario. Thus, sending Americans abroad is more cost-efficient; the U.S. government would pay less money for each first-hand impression that those abroad would have with an American. Of course, these Americans are public diplomats of the highest importance, and should be selected carefully to ensure those are sent abroad who can shoulder such responsibility.

Second, sending Americans abroad will educate our own people about the cultures of the Middle East and North Africa. While public diplomacy is ultimately about ‘selling America’, America must first be worthy of sale. Today the U.S. is exporting culture and images around the world. Young people in Egypt, Tunisia, and even Iran are familiar with American music and movies. What is also visible in the Middle East and North Africa is the obvious lack of understanding and knowledge that Americans have about them. How many Americans have heard or seen music or movies from any state in the Middle East or North Africa? Very few. This cultural communication is not two-way. As such, sending Americans abroad to experience other cultures will introduce our people to different worldviews and lifestyles. This is greatly important because for each Katy Perry song which is sought out in Lebanon, a headline about an American burning the Quran is read. For every Brad Pitt movie seen in Turkey there is a story of racial profiling in American airports. And, as noted above, since negative stories resonate more than positive ones, these instances create serious and long-term harm to America’s image abroad. By sending Americans abroad the U.S. can educate its own people, creating a much more informed and value asset to ‘sell’ to the Middle East and North Africa. Relatedly, by sending more Americans aboard, foreign language acquisition will be encouraged. Learning the language of another people is key to understanding that people, and by encouraging a more understanding American people, fewer knee-jerk reactions to foreigners will occur and be depicted around the world. While it certainly is important for people of the Middle East and North Africa to learn English in order to understand the U.S., we as Americans must show initiative by learning Arabic, Farsi, Hebrew, etc, instead of expecting the people of the Middle East and North Africa to take the time to learn about us.

Lastly, sending Americans abroad is more politically palatable for legislators at home. In times of tight government budgets both at home and aboard, attention must be paid to the economic and political realities of policies when proposing new or altered agenda. Cash-strapped constituents have increasingly been holding Congressmen and women accountable on votes for new spending. As such, this policy would be mindful that it would be easier for a congressman or woman to say ‘I voted for a bill which will pay to send Americans abroad’ than ‘I voted for a bill which will pay to bring foreigners here’. This is because the first statement will feel much more like a benefit for those sent abroad, whereas the latter sounds like the taxpayers are bestowing a benefit on the foreign traveler. While the American people are generally generous, this would likely be a less popular allocation of tax dollars.

The reasons for sending Americans to the Middle East and North Africa are strong. Classic educational opportunities for study and research abroad give Americans incredible opportunities to discover other cultures and discuss and exemplify American values in the Middle East and North Africa. However, the U.S. Department of State should not limit such programs to classic educational exchanges and study abroad. In the wake of the Arab Spring North Africa has seen historic elections in both Tunisia and Egypt. More elections are planned in Egypt, and soon Libya should be joining in holding elections. The U.S. has a clear opportunity to offer to these states individuals with years of experience running elections to help in the logistics and implementation of free and fair elections. The U.S. can also send professionals to the Middle East and North Africa, such as lawyers, journalists, public administrators, and civil society support. Along with the research mentioned above, the U.S. Department of State should seek out the needs of the states in the region and offer each state American human capital to assist in their pursuits, courtesy of the U.S. government. Such programs would help both formal and personal relations between the U.S. and states in the Middle East and North Africa.

Part III

Part I: Why conduct public diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa?

Introduction

Since 2001 the main public diplomacy strategy of the United States has been to win the “hearts and minds” of the people of the Middle East and North Africa. This was a direct response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, after which Americans were told, “they hate our freedoms”. This has been termed ‘Anti-Americanism’—the idea that foreign peoples, especially those in the Middle East and North Africa, hate what America is and that for which it stands. So in order to decrease this hatred for the U.S., it has been felt that our government should actively engage in building positive relationships with people and governments in Middle East and North Africa, as well as portray the U.S. as a necessary force for positive change in the region. Thus, by selling the idea of America to the people of the Middle East and North Africa, fewer of them would become terrorists, or would tolerate, support, or assist the goals and organizations of terrorism.

However, Anti-Americanism isn’t as simple as that. The negative sentiment toward the U.S. in that region most often comes from strong disagreements with our foreign policy than actual hatred of the American people. For example, since 2001 the U.S. has engaged in military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. Moreover, we have placed heavy sanctions on Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The U.S. is elbow deep in the honey jar. However Anti-Americanism is more complicated still: often the U.S. is used as an anti-political device; a distraction from disagreements and problems much closer to home. The details of the image of the U.S. must be known in order to engage in successful public diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa. Nonetheless, it can be done. Despite the complications of many states, ethnicities, religious groups, and conflicts, the U.S. can conduct a consistent, effective public diplomacy strategy in the Middle East and North Africa.

In order to conduct effective public diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa, the U.S. must coordinate official rhetoric, funding, hard power (economic trade, sanctions, military intervention, etc.), and messaging. All of these elements are extremely visible to the people of the Middle East and North Africa and must be connected closely with American values and ideals. Through government-funded research and private research the U.S. Department of State must identify the primary values and goals of the next generation of leaders in the Middle East and North Africa. As the population there is notably young and the Arab Spring has swept through the region, the opinions of young adults and new leaders are increasing more important. Increasingly the citizens of the Middle East and North Africa hold political clout with their governments. Thus, the perceptions of the U.S. held by the people in that region will increasingly affect the policy positions governments take, ultimately affecting diplomacy and trade with the U.S.

Thus, to court these groups U.S. foreign policy must make clear the relationship with the effects of U.S. policy seen on the ground in the Middle East and North Africa and the ideal of our founding documents and our legal order. Moreover, our motivations and methods of execution of specific policies must be transparent so as to promote the view of a trustworthy America. Any reputation of transparency and value-based foreign policy the U.S. may have had has been undermined by what was leaked to the world on WikiLeaks and hesitancy of support of revolutions during the Arab Spring. As such, working to build American transparency and consistency is of great importance. Such transparency, consistency of message, and faith to American values will allow the following specific policy proposals the best chance of success.

Part II

Part III

U.S. public diplomacy recommendations for the Middle East and North Africa

For my 25^th blog post, I wanted to discuss U.S. public diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa. However, it's a bit too long. As such, I will post the discussion in three parts.

Part I: Why public diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa? To cover this topic I first need to discuss the reasons behind the importance of U.S. public diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa for public diplomacy skeptics out there.

Then, I will suggest two foci for U.S. public diplomacy; one long-term and one short-term.

Part II: The long-term. The U.S. should increase the number of Americans sent to the region to engage in exchange, professional and governmental support programs.

Part III: The short-term. The U.S increase training to engage in mediated public diplomacy on the popular regional media. Together, these goals will work to help “win the hearts and minds” of the publics of the Middle East and North Africa while at the same time helping develop the region and educating Americans about the people of that region.

Rhetoric as Soft Power: Turkey and the Arab Spring

            The following post will discuss Turkey’s foreign policy regarding the recent ‘Arab Spring’ protests. Specifically to be discussed is Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s rhetoric toward the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and the ongoing protests in Syria. It is argued that in the first two instances, Erdogan’s rhetoric and actions seem to be complimentary, whereas in the latter two the rhetoric and actions appear to contradict. The post begins with a background of Turkey’s recent role in the region, moves on to Turkey’s reactions to the Arab Spring revolts, and concludes with future challenges facing Turkey in this area.

Background

            Since the reforms of Ataturk in the 1920s and 1930s the Turkish military has secured a secular democracy which now supports a strong economy. These factors have led Turkey to obtain an important international status. That status is binary—it is both European and Middle Eastern; or perhaps neither European nor Middle Eastern. Its entire history has been straddling both regions—much like its geography. While Turkey is a member of NATO and has aspired to be in the European Union, the nation also has close ties with the Arab League and is the successor state to the Ottoman Empire. In the early 2000s talk of Turkey’s ascension to the European Union intensified, as did opposition to its application by key members, such as Germany. While the process is quite complicated, many observers view the EU and Turkey as having shifted away from each other as the decade wore on. Among other factors, the fall of the Euro, the relative strength of the Turkish economy, the strong public sentiment in Europe against Turkey joining the EU and an ideological shift in the ‘Islamist’ direction by the ruling elite of Turkey have possibly pushed Turkey’s attention eastward. That ruling elite is the Justice and Development Party (AKP), an Islamist-leaning party which experiences constant tension with the military, the defenders of the Turkish secular state. As the party has risen in domestic politics, it seems, Turkey has risen on the international stage. The party’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has become one of the most popular Turkish leaders in modern times. The party came to power in 2002, and upon winning his third term on June 12 of this past year, Erdogan stated, “Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul; Beirut won as much as Izmir; Damascus won as much as Ankara; Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, Jerusalem won as much as Diyarbakir.” This has been seen as a conclusive signal that Turkey will focus its efforts on its neighbors and, more specifically, the Muslim world.

            In addition to wanting to be a good neighbor, Turkey has been positioning itself as a regional mediator. Ankara has found some results regarding the Kurds, Iraq, Armenia, and to some extent Russia. Moreover, over the past five years Turkey has actively attempted to broker peace agreements between both Israel and Palestine and Israel and Syria. The blame for that failure, however, has been pointed to Israel’s December 2008 armed operation in Gaza. Erdogan has been able to also get Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Iran to the negotiating table—with similarly disappointing results. With these more difficult negotiations, Turkey has seen the limit to its diplomatic strength. While Turkey has been able to build relationships and get people to sit at the negotiating table, there has been an inability to translate that popularity into tangible results. These and other actions have shown that Turkey wishes to be seen as a fair mediator: Israel is a major military ally, and yet the AKP wants to be seen as sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. To further this view, in 2010 Turkish citizens embarked on a flotilla to bring aid to the Gaza, in violation of a shipping blockade of the strip imposed by Israel. Noting that Gaza boarders Egypt to the south, which is not subject to the blockade, Israel intercepted the flotilla—the boarding and interception of the flotilla resulted in the deaths of some of the Turkish passengers. "When Turkey's prime minister vowed that Israel would ‘absolutely be punished by all means’ after its raid on the Freedom Flotilla bound for Gaza… the country's standing soared in many corners of the Arab world.” Moreover, earlier this year the UN released a report finding that although the blockade was legal, Israel used excessive force when intercepting the flotilla. In response, Turkey called on Israel to apologize for such force. Israel refused, so Erdogan expelled Israel’s ambassador in Ankara and has threatened action of Israeli oil drilling near Cyprus. This distancing from Israel is important as a symbolic issue of a greater pan-Arab support message which would prove to be important in winning the hearts and minds of Arabs during the Arab Spring.

The Arab Spring

            The Arab Spring began in Tunisia in late December 2010 after the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi. Protests in Tunisia spread and continued into early 2011 asking for economic and political reforms. These protests directly led to the fleeing of decades-long autocratic ruler Ben Ali. Soon after, the protests increased in popularity and spread to other countries such as Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, and Libya, and Yemen. Longtime autocratic ruler Hosni Mubarak in Egypt quickly fell; leaving the question of what types of government would arise from the ashes of revolution. Many pointed to Turkey as a model of Arab democracy: while the AKP held Islamic values, the governmental structure in Ankara reflected secular democracy.

Since coming to power in 2003 the AKP has argued for democratic values in the Arab context. “It was not an accident, for example, that both of the mainstream Islamic parties in Tunisia and Egypt -- the NAHDA and the Muslim Brotherhood -- announced that they would use the AKP as their example and run in elections, rather than striving for complete control.” Nonetheless, the Arab Spring took Turkey, like the rest of the world, by surprise. Many feel that Turkey was too slow to react to the events and ‘pick sides’. However, Erdogan was quick to recover. This is partially because the beginning of the Arab Spring was easy for the AKP: protesters in both Tunisia and Egypt were opposing secular dictators and showed strong support for both political Islam and democracy. Moreover, Erdogan had been sharpening his rhetoric toward Israel—increasing Turkey’s popularity among most Arab publics.

Hard power and soft power.

            In the Middle East the U.S. has generally employed hard power to support its foreign policy. Military intervention in Iraq, now Libya, and nearby Afghanistan have been the most visible examples. However, economic carrots toward Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia and sticks toward Syria, Iraq and Iran have also been points of contention throughout the region over the past few decades. This use of hard power has cost the U.S. greatly in terms of public diplomacy. While President Obama came to office promising a shift in relations—from negotiations with Iran to his visit to Turkey and his famed ‘Cairo speech’—he has since fallen into the same pattern of U.S. foreign relations. Obama has increased sanctions on Iran and Syria as well as engaged militarily with Libya and Pakistan.

            Erdogan has seen this game played in the Middle East before and offers juxtaposition. “Turkey’s policy of penetrating new markets and initiating economic integration projects with neighbors, accompanied by the removal of visa requirements, added a liberal touch to Ankara’s recent activism." Indeed, Turkey has been advocating “an idealist vision of regional order”, while generally not resorting to the hard power carrots and sticks favored by the U.S. While Turkey certainly could not have predicted the Arab Spring, it has been invested in populist movements before Tunisians hit the streets. As Ibrahim Kalin, a policy adviser to Erdogan, has said, “We’ve been criticized for engaging many of these groups, whether it’s Hezbollah or Hamas or the Muslim Brotherhood - the so-called difficult actors in the Middle East… but now most of these groups with which we’ve developed some sort of engagement… are going to play an important role in their respective countries.”

While the U.S. and much of the rest of the world was focused on the autocratic leaders of the region, Turkey was able to also focus on an increasingly empowered group—the people themselves. Regarding the Arab Spring Kalin argues that because of this, "Turkey will be strengthened, not weakened, by a more democratic and prosperous Arab world.” Furthering Turkey’s public diplomacy rhetoric, in June Ersat Hurmuzlu, an adviser to Turkish President Gül, said, “Turkey is with the people, not the regimes.” However, many feel that while Turkey has engaged in public diplomacy rhetoric, its real foreign policy actions and concerns are no different. To them, there is an undeniable gap between Turkish rhetoric and the reality of regional politics. Nowhere is such a gap more apparent than in Turkish reactions to the protests in Libya and neighboring Syria.

Libya and Syria.

            While it seemed easy for Erdogan to ‘catch up’ to the Arab Spring and call for Ben Ali of Tunisia and Mubarak of Egypt to step down, it was much less so to make similar calls against Qaddafi of Libya. Libya, after all, is a major economic partner of Turkey, representing billions of dollars in Turkish investment. If Qaddafi was able to survive the revolt, relations would have surely evaporated. As such, Erdogan originally criticized the NATO intervention to oust Qaddafi, only to support it later in the campaign. After calling on Qaddafi to step down, Erdogan invited Mustafa Abdul-Jalil to Ankara, who was the leader of the Libyan opposition. The hesitation, however, contrasted greatly with Erdogan’s earlier claims that Turkey was acting on a morally consistent foreign policy. As a result, while Turkey carefully balanced ideals with classic self-interested policy implications, the nation looked stumbling and weary of the future in Libya.

            In 2009 Erdogan was reluctant to criticize Iran’s suppression of the Green Movement, as that nation has traditionally represented a strong ally for Turkey. For this same reason, Ankara hesitated to act in the face of mounting protests in Syria and an iron-fisted response from Assad. Over the past eight months, Assad’s regime has killed over 3,500 protestors. After waiting for the Western world to stand first—much like its response to Libya—Turkey has now begun to host Syrian opposition and thousands of refugees flowing over the border as a result of the conflict. Again, this hesitation has called into question Turkey’s supposed commitment to morally-led and autonomous foreign policy. Presently, Assad remains in power in Syria, as his relations with Ankara have progressively soured. Last month, Syrians attacked Turkey’s diplomatic mission to Syria for supporting an Arab League decision to suspend Syria in response to Assad’s brutal oppression of the uprising there. Last week, Turkey imposed historic heavy sanctions on Syria over these continued actions. With such tensions between Damascus and Ankara still rising, Turkey's stance toward Syria, with whom it shares 900km of border, is the real test of Erdogan's commitment to democracy. Moreover, as Turkey continues to distance itself from Assad, Iran will increasingly feel betrayed, a partner the AKP would rather not lose.

            Critics of Turkey’s reactions to Libya and Syria contend that the problem lies in Erdogan’s rhetoric. By using principled, idealistic rhetoric when the policy decisions are rather easy, Turkish foreign policy has shied away from the tools of hard power. Thus, when decisions of support for an ally arise or when such hard power seems necessary or appropriate, Erdogan has exposed himself to charges of hypocrisy. As such, with regard to Libya and Syria, Turkey’s soft power appears to have failed to create actual results. Indeed, “the Arab Spring seems to have been a learning experience for Ankara. It also showed that the United State's foreign policy conundrum—how to maintain the tricky balance between national interests and idealism—is not unique.” In order to avoid this issue in the future, the AKP should adopt more nuanced and detailed policy positions, such that Turkey can advocate for both soft power and hard power—termed ‘smart power’—consistently and practically.

Difficulties after the dust has settled

Turkey now sees itself as a ‘big brother’ to the new leaders in the Arab Spring countries. By Erdogan’s own choosing, “the extent to which Turkey succeeds in setting up a regional order will be crucial for its emergence as a central country in regional and, consequently, global politics."

 As the unrest of the Arab Spring settled, Erdogan embarked on his ‘Arab Spring Tour’. From September 12 through September 15 of this year he visited Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. Erdogan has traveled to these countries speaking of an obligation to promote peace and freedom through its regional and global foreign policy. Erdogan feels that Turkey has been advocating its diplomatic model of “connectivity and autonomy over containment and alignment” for the Arab Spring nations. However, Turkey cannot rest. Egypt has been a regional power in the past, and the Egyptian people will likely prove to be defiant of the U.S., strongly opposed to Israel, and may form contacts with Tehran. Indeed, “Turkey might find that it is no longer the only regional actor pursuing a policy of connectivity and nonalignment." Moreover, Turkey’s past support of autocrats—such as Qaddafi and Assad—and the AKP’s treatment of the Kurdish separatists may prove to expose Turkey as ideologically liberal in theory but practitioners of realpolitik in reality. As Erdogan must realize, supporting democracy abroad invites criticism of any non-democratic practices in the domestic realm.

            Lastly, because of the countries’ recently good relationship, Turkey cannot get many more miles out of anti-Israeli rhetoric. Given Turkey’s past relations with Iran, Israel, Europe, Syria, and the U.S., the country has simply straddled too many strong divides in the region. For every Arab won over by anti-Israeli rhetoric, another frets that Israel is Turkey’s largest military supplier. For every Shia won over by close ties with Iran and Syria, Turkey’s friendship with the U.S. and European desires are cause for concern. Turkey is not Arab and is unwanted by the Europeans.

Conclusion

            Turkey presents itself as both physically and politically straddling the Bosporus; at the same time it is both European and Middle East, while equally neither at all. This places Turkey in a unique position to convincingly advocate for Islamic democracy in a region which has shown to thirst for such a system. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring revolutions, Erdogan has spoken loudly about his support for democracy in the region, especially in Tunisia and Egypt. However, he has carried a small stick which he has often hesitated to use, such as in Libya and Syria. This has led many to question Turkey’s noble motives, having them chalked up as just as self-interested as any other actor in the region.

In order to continue to capitalize on the revolutions taking place in the Middle East, Turkey must continue its public diplomacy strategy of talking to the future power holders in that region: the people. To remain influential among the ‘Arab street’ as elections occur and new governments take hold, Ankara must remain true to both Arab issues and democracy. As such, Turkey must continue to champion the Palestinian cause while making peace with the Kurds, so as to not appear hypocritical when supporting revolutions abroad.