Ryan J. Suto's Blog

Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts

04 November 2013

Moral Relativism & US Public Diplomacy (revised)

This update of an older post was written for the Public Diplomat and can be found here.


As the science of morality progresses, US public diplomacy should educate others despite any cultural differences.
Since the Age of Exploration, the dominant views of Europeans toward people who populated the other continents were paternalistic and ethnocentric — to not be Europeans and Christian instantly diminished the worth of a person or a belief. Relatively recently, the prevailing view in Europe and the West has shifted to become more tolerant — perhaps in reaction to the brutality of past injustices. In the extreme this has led to moral relativism, a judgment-free approach toward the values of other cultures. At present this view is ubiquitous in anthropological and sociological literature. As a modern, accepting people, so the argument goes, we shall not narrow-mindedly impose our morals on others.
But this argument assumes that morality is a subjective notion, or that there is no objective measure by which one can judge others actions or values. The only reason these assumptions have not been effectively challenged, argues Sam Harris in his book The Moral Landscape, is because we have an underdeveloped science of morality. Harris makes a key point: unknown is not the same as unknowable. Just because we have yet to coalesce on a singular measure of objective moral judgment does not mean that we will not be able to do so in the future. In light of the history of scientific and rational progress, we cannot say that the fields of neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and anthropology will never advance and be able to determine that certain actions, beliefs and principles are objectively counter to human well-being.
Can one say that rights of self-governance are objectively morally good?  Can one say that deploring despotic rule is merely a subjective preference, based on little more than culturally arbitrary preferences? One’s answer to these questions is vital to one’s view of public diplomacy. If the answer is that there is no objective truth on such moral questions, then why should the American people try to influence other cultures with portraying our values of democracy and human rights? If it’s for mere economic gain, why not sell the beaches of Hawai’i instead of
democracy and human rights? Surely vacation destinations are far easier to sell in places like China. If public diplomacy only functions to serve our subjective national trade or diplomacy interests, should it be valued as a legitimate field, or simply method of propaganda?
I view public diplomacy more expansively. The message of public diplomacy, like any other communication, must come from our ‘mission statement’ — the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration tells a candid world with what rights all people[1] were born — not just Americans. It discusses why all governments are instituted—not just the U.S. government. These are statements claiming objective truth! As such, I argue that any U.S. public diplomacy which flows from our organizational mission statement cannot be morally relative. And while the science of morality is underdeveloped, that does not mean that nothing is known. Harris compares morality to health: just as we know that eating only marshmallows is less likely to lead to a healthy body than eating a diet which includes leafy green vegetables and protein, we also know that enslaving or subjugating women or whole ethnic groups are less likely to result in human flourishing than equal rights and opportunities for all. For these reasons, U.S. public diplomacy should not shy away from strongly holding any cultural or political practice as superior to those which we know are wrong — especially as science progresses to advance our knowledge and understanding on these points[2].
In a sense, U.S. public diplomacy should not narrowly seek to advance our economic interests, but instead promote values which are objectively aligned with the promotion of human well-being. And as our understanding of human happiness and well-being advances, the more we will know about the science of morality, and the better we can conduct our public diplomacy toward educating others. “What right does the West have to tell a conservative Islamic country that women should not wear the veil?” one might ask. Someday, perhaps as much right as one has to assert that the Earth is an oblate spheroid and revolves around the Sun, and anyone arguing the contrary is simply wrong.

[1] I generally take “all men” to mean “all humans,” but even if Jefferson explicitly meant the male gender, the point still stands that it was meant universally to all men, not just American men.
[2] I don’t assume that the U.S. has any monopoly on objective morality. No study has shown that corporal punishment bestows any long-term benefit on any person, yet the U.S. stands as a country which frequently practices it. Science also requires flexibility and recalibration in the face of evidence.

18 January 2013

Equal and Inalienable: Natural Human Rights and the ICCPR

This paper about a possible scientific basis for natural human rights can be found here.


Abstract:      

This paper first seeks to establish a scientific basis for the finding of natural human rights and how rights relate to morals, law, and culture. Next, the paper focuses on the derogation mechanism of article 4 of the ICCPR, compares derogable rights and non-derogable rights, and investigates the assumptions of derogation. Lastly, the paper finds an over-inclusive nature of the ICCPR, which results in the artificial imposition of extra-natural rights, leading to low levels of any compliance. Thus a lack of compliance to the ICCPR in whole violates the actual natural human rights which are enumerated. It suggests that an international human rights regime which is restricted to demonstrable natural human rights, without derogation, and including more forceful enforcement mechanisms would be a more effective tool of promoting human rights throughout the world.

17 July 2012

The Social Contract Revisited

Hello! By using America’s services, protections and opportunities, you agree to the following rights and obligations, and any policies, laws or amendments thereto that may be agreed upon through explicit legal processes. Provisions are made for updates in the future, and you will be able to find the most current version of this agreement in state and federal law.

Do you remember seeing that language at birth? No? What about at 18 years old, the age of adulthood in the US? No? That’s odd…

What is a contract?

Contracts wasn’t my favorite class in law school, to be honest. I claim no authority in the field. But a contract is really just the creation of one or more legal obligations between parties.

A common mistake is to assume that contracts require explicit consent. All product ‘terms and conditions’ are forms of contracts, and simply by using the product are you considered to assent to such terms and conditions. We all probably make hundreds of contracts each day. For example, let’s say you sit down at a buffet, the waitress brings you water, and then you begin to fill you plate. A bloated hour later you are full. How would it go over if you simply strolled out of the establishment without paying? Probably not well. A contract was formed through your actions and the tacit understanding that an exchange would occur: food for cash. You didn’t sign anything and the waitress didn’t make sure you explicitly understood that monetary compensation would be expected when you finally tapped-out.

In theory, the law would step in and require you to pay for the buffet if such a suit were brought to court. Why? Because you gained a benefit, conferred by another, without offering compensation in a circumstance when compensation was reasonably expected. In a term of art, you were unjustly enriched.

What is a state?

A state is a legal structure which has a population and a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within its territory. Why would anyone cede the ability to unquestioningly use force to some legal structure? Let’s ask the Declaration of Independence:

That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,

So people would theoretically enter into a state to secure life and liberty. And the state claims only power which comes from the people within it. That’s fine and dandy, but if a body is given power, it would likely abuse it in some way, wouldn’t it? It might even go so far as to disregard its original purpose. What do we do when this happens?

That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

So when a government destroys liberty instead of securing it, the people have the right to change it or get rid of it all together. That unrelated concept of a contract is beginning to sounds familiar; rights, obligations, and remedies for breaches. But how do we know when a breach occurs, when to oust the state?

Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed.

This is really just a recommendation and then a warning: Don't get rid of your government for stupid reasons, but to be honest people have a predisposition to tolerate a government that sucks rather than to get off the couch and change it.

OK, this state thing sounds like a contract, but I didn’t agree to it!

Oh, you did—you just don’t know it yet.

Just like at the buffet, a contract was formed through your actions and the tacit understanding that an exchange would occur. What actions? Voting, paying taxes, or benefitting from services paid for by taxes, etc. all indicate a use of the service provided for in the contract and tacit consent of the contract itself. By partaking in the state’s services, protections and opportunities you have been enriched at the cost of the other parties in the contract. It’s a quid pro quo, a reciprocating duty: you must uphold you end of the bargain. Elizabeth Warren put it nicely (paraphrased):

You built a factory out there? Good for you. But I want to be clear: you moved your goods to market on the roads the rest of us paid for; you hired workers the rest of us paid to educate; you were safe in your factory because of police forces and fire forces that the rest of us paid for. You didn't have to worry that marauding bands would come and seize everything at your factory, and hire someone to protect against this, because of the work the rest of us did. Now look, you built a factory and it turned into something terrific, or a great idea? Keep a big hunk of it. But part of the underlying social contract is you take a hunk of that and pay forward for the next kid who comes along.

If you don’t like this contract, there are of course ways out. Otherwise, it would be coercive! First, the Declaration of Independence notes, supra, when you have the right to destroy the whole contract. Second, the Constitution explains the processes for changing the specific terms while maintaining the contact generally. Third, you can stop benefitting from the contract, and thus your reciprocal obligations would no longer be required. Yes, I’m suggesting moving out of the country.

Note: The Westphalian state/social contract paradigm has shifted since the time of the Declaration of Independence due to the philosophy embodied in the Responsibility to Protect. Previously the contractual relationship was only the business of the state and the people within its territory. But now the UN has asserted the right to be involved in this relationship. This is quite new, but we have seen a growing trend of humanitarian and military interventions in situations which ordinarily would have been viewed as wholly domestic issues. 

Some problems with social contract theory

First, no person has a choice as to what political system into which that person is born. Individuals become beneficiaries (or victims) of state probably immediately. Thus affirmative action must be taken to change the terms or change contracts. But how would we remedy this? The choices are limited: anarchy, governance with no claims of the consent of the governed, or to create a stateless land of wild children, who upon a certain age would be required to choose a state to enter. Antarctica is a bit too cold this time of year for that, I think.

Second, there are opportunity costs to leaving a given territory. Even if someone studied all the social contracts out there, and picked their favorite one, there are costs and hurdles to getting there. This is especially true for the economically disadvantaged, who are more ‘stuck’ with a state in which they often have decreasing voice. But relocation is pretty common. If nothing else, history is the story of human migration. If you’re an American, unless you're full Native or fully descended from those brought here unwillingly, your ancestors made this exact choice.

Third, at times it is effectively contract of adhesion. There are so many parties to the contract that any change requires a large number of parties to agree or any change. Each individual is only 1 in over 300,000,000 parties, and like most contracts, you can’t unilaterally change its terms.

Fourth, one might argue that a contract without explicit consent is in itself presumptuous or immoral. There is some ground here, but that would solve nothing. For each contract we presently enter unknowingly, there are almost just as many that we simply click through or sign on because they are too long or we aren’t interested. The social contract is no different.

There are probably others, too…

Thoughts

Even if you view the social contract as a noble lie, it at least serves as a useful understanding of why it is deplorable for individuals to choose to ignore the opportunities and advantages that have been provided to them with taxpayer money and try at every corner to get out of any reciprocating obligation.

I understand, and am sympathetic to, disagreeing with almost everything that a government does and feeling that government has not upheld the values in the founding documents. I often admire movements like the Tea Party and Occupy because they are actively trying to change the contract for those very reasons. Alternatively, with the services and opportunities provided in other countries, I completely understand leaving the US for greener pastures.

But it is wholly unfair to continue to reap benefits provided through government services, then act as if you don’t—only to make yourself feel justified in trying to not pay your fair share back into the system. Don’t think what is presently asked is fair? You can work to change that, too—but keep in mind the costs of what you have gained a la the Warren quote above. While many states go so far as to require periods of national service, all I ask from Americans is to recognize benefits derived, to not be so bitter about reciprocating, and to please work to change the system for the better, should you choose to remain.

The current electoral and political system in the US is approaching, if not already in, a state of complete dysfunction. That is not to say it is irreparable, of course. But what we need, more than ever, is a citizenry who will roll up their sleeves and invest time and money into getting America back on course by either fixing our current institutions or abandoning them for wholly new ones. If you would rather leave, that’s fine. But we have neither the time nor the inclination to deal with individuals who wish to cheat the system by gaining from its outputs and yet have no desire or intent to pay back into the system their fair share.

25 February 2011

Moral Relativism and Public Diplomacy

To continue my ‘X and Public Diplomacy’ blog series, I wish to discuss the importance of moral relativism—or moral absolutism—in the realm of public diplomacy and foreign policy in general.

For centuries, the European view of indigenous people was paternalistic and ethnocentric—to not be Europeans and Christian instantly diminished the worth of a person or a value. Recently (relatively speaking), many in the West have shifted, as if to make up for past injustices, toward a more judgment-free approach toward the moral values of other cultures. This view, moral relativism, is ubiquitous in anthropological and sociological literature. As a modern, accepting people, so the argument goes, we shall not narrow-mindedly impose our morals on others.

The question, of course, is this: is there an objective measure by which one can judge the morals of a people? Sam Harris, in his new book The Moral Landscape, seems to think so. Harris holds that the highest moral good is that which promotes the well-being of all sentient creatures. Thus, any act that is counter to promoting general well-being is morally bad. Despite being well versed in philosophy, he glosses over centuries of philosophical discourse on the subject and falls into a form of utilitarianism.

However, Harris makes a key point: unknown is not the same as unknowable. Just because we have yet to coalesce on a singular measure of objective moral judgment does not mean that we will not be able to do so in the future. On this point I agree. In light of the history of scientific and rational progress, we cannot say that the fields of neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and anthropology will never advance and be able to determine that certain actions, beliefs, and principles are clearly counter to human well-being.

In light of recent events, are the rights that the Tunisians, Egyptians, and others fought for objectively morally good?  Can one say that deploring despotic rule is merely a subjective preference, based on little more than culturally arbitrary preferences? One’s answer to these questions is vital to one’s view of public diplomacy. If the answer is that there is no objective truth on such moral questions, then why should the American people try to influence other cultures with portraying our values of democracy and human rights? If public diplomacy is only to serve our subjectivity to the ends of our national trade or diplomacy interests, should it be valued as a legitimate field, or simply method of propaganda?

I view public diplomacy more expansively. I ask not (and promote not) what values best serves my country or my people in the economic and diplomatic sphere, I ask (and promote) what values I feel are objectively aligned with the promotion of human well-being. Anything less would relegate the validation of public diplomacy to a role morality.

When science catches up to society and we begin to get more answers to our most basic questions (and once it does, one cannot assume that any of our Western morals would prove to be best), I will be waiting—ready to view the evidence and improve my own public diplomacy. What right do I have to tell a conservative Muslim that women should not wear the veil? Someday, perhaps as much right as I have to tell a conservative Christian that the Earth is four and a half billion years old.

20 September 2010

Personal Safety: Balancing Demographic Propensities and Societal Values

For this post, I bring forth a common question of safety and equality: If a demographic group has a greater propensity to commit a particular crime, is one socially allowed to avoid individuals of that demographic group in the interest of his or her personal safety?
Here, we can think of several examples. Would you trust a male to babysit your young child, as males have a higher propensity for violence? If you are walking down a dark street, are you justified in feeling more threatened based on the gender or race of the person passing by? To this end, I will paraphrase Joshua Dressler, a leading scholar in criminal law:
Even if the typical American believes  that blacks' propensity toward violence justifies a quicker and more forceful response when a suspected assailant is black, this fact is legally significant only if the law defines reasonable beliefs as typical beliefs. Legal reasonableness, however, extends beyond typicality to consider the social interests implicated in a given situation. Hence 'typical' beliefs are not per se reasonable. If we accept that racial discrimination violates contemporary social morality, then an actor's failure to overcome his or her racism for the sake of another's health, safety, and personal dignity is blameworthy and thus unreasonable, independent of whether it is 'typical'.
So, if we value equality as a society, then such discrimination in the interest of personal safety is socially blameworthy. What do you think? Are you willing to put aside statistical propensities in the interest of social equality, or are such things to abstract to ‘risk’ safety?

This quote by Dressler seems to be aimed at the very idea of 'latent racism' or 'racism of the mind'.  This almost institutional racism is in large part our current racial issue in the U.S. We seldom must condemn overt acts or statements of racism. However, this 'subtle racism' is pervasive. I think that, as a society, we value equality quite highly. So highly, in fact, that these considerations must be discouraged. The first step toward curing the racism in the world is to cure the racism in the mind, and this must be done by showing such things are socially unacceptable.