Assured Dysfunction: Egypt’s Parliamentary Constituencies Law

This post can also be found at the Atlantic Council.

Earlier this week Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi approved a law to govern the upcoming parliamentary elections, presently scheduled to occur “before the end of March 2015.” The law creates an electoral system which is overly complex, marginalizes political parties, and allows for easy government manipulation. 

In accordance with Article 102 of the Egyptian Constitution, the law calls for the House of Representatives to include 567 members: 120 members chosen from closed party lists, 420 individuals elected by geographic districts, and 27 member appointed by the president. Each elected official will serve a 5-year term. 

Regarding the 120 seats chosen from closed party lists, Egypt will be divided into four large geographic regions. Each party will have a separate list with candidates from each region. The final 120 members must include at least 24 Christians, 21 females, 8 Egyptians living abroad, and 8 handicapped persons. Regarding the 420 individuals, they will be elected as independents from 237 electoral districts. Of those districts, 83 will elect a single representative, 123 will elect two, and 30 will elect three representatives. Presidential spokesperson Alaa Youssef stated that each elected member would “represent equal segments of the electorate.” 

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TIMELINE June 9: The Parliamentary Election Law is issued by then-interim President Adly Mansour. December 8: The Electoral Districts Committee sent the bill to the cabinet for approval of the proposed 231 electoral districts. December 10: Egypt’s cabinet approved the bill and sent it to the State Council. December 15: the State Council increased the number of independent constituencies to 237 and approved the law. December 16: The High Electoral Commission approved the law. December 22: President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi approved the law.

This electoral system, like others of Egypt’s past, is complicated. The presence of a parallel voting system, similar to that of the 2012 constitution, is not by itself overly complicated. It is used in countries such as Japan and the Philippines. But a parallel voting system which includes new electoral districts of variable district magnitudes (the number of representatives elected in a given district) and four regional party lists is a lot to digest for any political community, especially one which has seen several new constitutions and heads of state within the past four years. The political process, for voters and parties, of learning the incentives of new electoral structure will be gradual, and will be based more on experiences from previous elections than detailed analyses of the current law. 

The benefits of the system’s complication, however, are not sufficient. Regarding district magnitude, only 30 districts will elect three candidates and 80 will elect only one, with the majority electing just two. These variations in district magnitude could have different effects on strategic voting, how centrist or extreme the elected representatives are, and to what extent elected officials deviate from the desires of voters. While each elected official will represent about 131,000 voters, Egyptians in different electoral districts will be asked to vote and think in different ways. As such, Egyptian in districts which are physically much smaller in cities like Cairo and Alexandria will vote differently than Egyptians in physically larger districts in the desert and in Upper Egypt. Generally, the simultaneous use of a majoritarian system in parallel with a proportional system is motivated by the desire to mitigate the drawbacks of each. However, it is unclear if this goal is actually achieved in practice. 

The marginalization of the political influence of parties by restricting them from participating in the majoritarian contests could be one such goal. Only 120 of 567 members of the legislature are allowed to carry the banner of a party. Even if all 120 proportionally-allotted seats were won by a single party, no governing legislative majority would be possible in order to present a unified voice to challenge the political power of the presidency. This was likely a desired result of those who crafted the electoral law: parties are given far fewer seats than they were during the late-2011 through early-2012 legislative elections which were dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. The past electoral strength of Muslim Brotherhood has likely turned the present government sour to political parties, thus leading to a conscious decision to marginalize their potential strength within electoral politics. Nonetheless, the Conference Party supports the law, and theWafd Party, the Reform and ‎Development Party, Egyptian Front, and Democratic Alliance will participate in the election, with many expressing criticism of the law. Both the Egyptian Social Democratic Party and al Dostour Party have opposed the law. 

A related, though distinct, decision which strengthens the present government’s hand is the prevalence of geographically-based representatives. Farid Zahran of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party expressed concern the government might gerrymander, engaging in the splintering and packing of opposition-heavy geographic areas. Zahran is right to be concerned: the drawing of electoral districts by a unitary, partisan body is the easiest way to manipulate the results of an election while maintaining the veil of legitimacy. Moreover, these elections are particularly important as the first parliamentary plebiscite under the 2014 constitution, as they will set the precedent of electoral behavior in all future elections. 

This law creates the need for both voters and parties to perform complex political calculus, nearly eliminates the ability for any party to form a legislative coalition, and gives the government an unchecked ability to draw electoral lines. In the context of a strong executive as both enshrined in the 2014 constitution and as seen in practice, this law assures that Egypt’s legislature will be too dysfunctional and manipulable to act as a legitimate check on executive power. 

Egypt's Experts Propose a Constitution — and It's Not a Good Start

This post was written in my capacity as Research Associate for the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, and can be found here.

The 10-person expert committee charged with making recommendations for a new or revised Egyptian constitution finished its task this week. The draft constitution will now head to a larger, 50-person committee for further review or changes before being sent to be voted on by the Egyptian people. While other recommended changes, such as those regarding gender equality, application of sharia, and the nature of political parties, get more attention, the design of the legislature will be the focus of this article. Despite the committee being composed of law professors and judges, the proposed new structure is not only remarkably simplistic, it is unimaginative. The recommended changes are also ill-suited for the realities of Egypt, and if they are retained by the larger committee and affirmed by the people, they could lead to long-term trouble for the country’s political landscape.

The unicameral, majoritarian structure of the legislature lacks imagination. It is simply the oldest and perhaps least democratic design the committee could have selected. By "least democratic," I mean it will likely seat politicians in proportions that are not reflective of the will of the people. As Zaid al-Ali has written before, there will likely be no legal revolution in Egyptian elections or legislative structures.

There are two main problems with the selected majoritarian system: manipulation and representation. First, a geography-dependent system can easily fall victim to partisan gerrymandering. Outside the U.S. context, gerrymandering was heavily used in South Africa before 1994. Next, representation is often skewed in most majoritarian elections. Of particular concern in Egypt must be the Christian minority. With only roughly 10% of the population, Christians will be hard-pressed to get elected in any districts where they are not a plurality of the population, as garnering 10% of the vote in a majoritarian district awards a candidate zero power. In a proportional system, however, 10% of the vote would gain a party 10% of the power, generally. Further, experience shows that most majoritarian systems structurally disadvantage female representation — an oversight Egypt cannot afford. This system will give power only to those who can garner a majority of support in each district, which risks the disenfranchisement of the many smaller political factions which exist in Egypt. I have recommended before that the committee find a more inclusive political structure for such a divided society. 

Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of the current situation is that there are so many less flawed systems from which the committee could have chosen. Egypt’s previous constitution featured a mixed systemwhereby one-third of the representatives were elected by first-past-the-post and two-thirds were elected by proportional representation (PR). While some might recommend pure PR in divided societies, such a system precludes both geographic representation and the creation of an individual accountability nexus between citizens and their legislators.

The system I'd propose for Egypt would be a proportional representation system with open provincial lists. In such a system, each of Egypt’s 27 provinces would have open lists featuring local candidates. This would require each party contesting in a given province to present a list of local, party-approved candidates. The number of seats given to each province would be proportional to their populations. This system would allow for individuals from each province to be represented in Cairo without the concern of gerrymandering (so long as the provincial boundaries remain) while still creating multi-member districts in which women and political and religious minorities have real chances for meaningful representation. This system’s open lists would allow voters to have control over which individuals are seated, thus increasing party transparency and helping to ensure that those seated are truly selected by the people they represent.

While my suggestion is by no means the only good solution, it seems the experts chose the worst one. A pure majoritarian system will give disproportionate representation to larger parties and to the parties that can organize and mobilize best. Ironically, assuming that neither are functionally banned, the likely beneficiaries of such a system are the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party and the National Democratic Party of former President Mubarak. While a constitution alone does not make a democracy, a poorly written constitution can severely cripple one. Egyptians, unfortunately, know this better than most.

GOP Vote Rigging 2013: Why the Republican Plan to Gerrymander the Electoral College Could Destroy Democracy

This is a post I wrote about electoral reform in the U.S. for PolicyMic which can be found here.

Electoral reform has crept into the fore of American politics again, as President Obama told the nation in his recent second inaugural address; "our journey is not complete until no citizen is forced to wait for hours to exercise the right to vote." This statement was in reference to various changes in voting laws made and proposed throughout the country, primarily by Republicans, in preparation for Election Day back in November 2012.

Now that 2012 is over, about a week ago Republicans got started working on changes for 2016.

While both parties engage in shameless gerrymandering, Republicans have generally pursued two extra forms of electoral changes. First, they have sought to disenfranchise populations which reliably vote Democratic (minorities, college students, etc) by making voting requirements increasing and often unreasonably burdensome. Second, they have recently begun seeking to change the way states which often lean Democratic in president elections award their Electoral College votes.

Both types of changes present serious concerns to democracy. The first should be obvious — systematically creating disproportionate burdens on portions of the citizenry is inherently anti-democratic. On this point, former Secretary of State Colin Powell (R) recently stated, "the Republican Party should be a party that says, 'we want everybody to vote,' and make it easier for people to vote and give them a reason to vote for the party, and not to find ways to keep them from voting at all."

The second tactic — the change in the way individual states award Electoral College votes — is a bit subtler. At present, each state decides how to award their Electoral College votes. All states, save for the small Nebraska and Maine, presently engage in a "winner-take-all" system. Those two states award their vote by congressional district — and this is 'reform' being sought currently by Republicans across the country. While this may sound benign enough, the consequences could be deeply troubling. If Republicans in states like Virginia, California, or New York succeed — states that have gone blue in the national elections but have a lot of red in their legislatures — those states would also distribute their electoral votes by congressional district. What's the desired result? When a Republican wins a "red" state, the candidate would get all the votes. But when a Democrat wins one of these "blue" states, the candidate would only get a portion of the state's vote, leaving the Democrat to a sizeable disadvantage nationally.

While I have written elsewhere about the problems with the current system, Columbia University statistics and political science professor Andrew Gelman writes of the 2012 election, "Romney needed about 50.5% of the national two-party vote to have had a 50/50 chance of winning in the Electoral College." He notes that this is certainly a bias that should be fixed. However, Professor Gelman continues, "in contrast, the bias that would ensue if the electoral vote were conducted via congressional districts — that would be huge."

Electoral reform is often a dry, complicated subject. But make no mistake about its importance. Elections are the very processes by which We The People express our views, and as such require more attention from our generation. While our national (and many state) election laws are antiquated and in need of real reform, we must be vigilant of the consequences of those reforms. Concerns of fairness, accuracy and access should characterize electoral reform, not partisan maneuvering. That might smack of naiveté and idealism, but maybe it has to — our democracy depends on it. 

Non-Self Determination: Foreign Elements in Iraq's Post-Conflict Electoral Design

This paper about the US's decisions regarding Iraq's elections after the fall of Saddam Hussein can be found here.

Abstract:      

This paper discusses the elections which took place in 2005 after the US-led invasion of Iraq. Specifically, it focuses on the policy choices made by foreign and foreign-chosen actors regarding those elections. After offering a background of the post-invasion setting, the electoral system for these elections was described. Lastly, offered are four critiques. First, that the January 2005 election to create a body to write a new constitution should have resulted in a much more representative body given the importance of constitution writing. Next, the de-Ba’athification process itself served to undermine the legitimacy of the transitional elections. Moreover, a truth commission for state-sponsored injustice and the use of amnesty would have proven to be a better model for transitional justice than de-Ba’athification. Lastly, foreign influences in Iraq were a primary hindrance which rendered the transitional process largely unsuccessful. This paper argues that the chief problem with democracy at gunpoint is that as a process it is not chosen democratically, and as such bequeaths upon the resultant systems an original sin of external imposition. The paper suggests that such foreign actors in the future should consider more fully the ramifications of imposed democracy.

Monochromatic Rule in the Rainbow Nation: Electoral Design in Post-Apartheid South Africa

This paper on post-conflict electoral engineering in South Africa can be found here.

Abstract:      

In this paper I discuss the constitutional and electoral policies of post-apartheid South Africa. Specifically, I discuss whether the electoral design of its National Assembly has promoted multiparty democracy. Now nearly two decades removed from the ending of apartheid, I also discuss whether South Africa should seek a new electoral system for the National Assembly. I first discuss relevant history and the negotiations to end apartheid; I then discuss the results and implications of the post-apartheid elections. Lastly, I discuss South Africa’s electoral future and offer open-list proportional representation with provincial-specific lists as an ideal electoral reform.

Restructuring Two UN Bodies

This post is an excerpt from a paper I have written this semester. The argument is that the structure of the United Nations does violence on groups with little influence among nations. Presently, for a small population to obtain a ceremonial international show of support, the people would have to lobby and convince a majority of the 193 nations of the General Assembly to support their cause. For any group, this is a daunting task. Moreover, to achieve a binding international resolution in their favor, such a group would specifically have to lobby the P-5 and four non-permanent members of the Security Council. Even a rather large and strong nation is often unable to resist the economic and military power of those nations which compose the Security Council.

Without any actual protection of minority rights, the United Nations forces the exploited and downtrodden to rely on the sense of justice of the Security Council, often the very nations which exploited and tread on such groups in the first place. From the point of view of many former and currently colonized people, this structure makes the perpetrators of the worst international offenses the judges and juries of the international system. The structure of the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations makes it clear that not all sovereignties are created equal. By giving the P-5 veto power, this structure exacerbates and formalizes the inequalities of power among nations. Indeed one member of the P-5 is at least as powerful as half of the 193 member nations. This structure can hardly be considered democratic or just.

While it is important to maintain the General Assembly as the main body of the U.N., there is also need for the Security Council to make quick decisions. One possible reform would be to allow the General Assembly to have the ability to pass binding resolutions. Then the Security Council and the General Assembly could be able to check the other in some way.

Nonetheless, the Security Council simply must be restructured. The new Security Council should be elected by the General Assembly (as are present non-permanent members of the Security Council) for two-year non-consecutive terms. The electoral system to be used will be Ranked Pairs (a form of Condorcet voting where each voter ranks the candidates in order of preference), which will ensure that the most politically agreeable candidates are seated on the Security Council. Moreover, the Security Council will be increased to 20 and there will be no permanent members.

As the U.N.’s goals, inter alia, are global peace and self-determination, granting sovereignty to a people who wish for independence should require a lower threshold than the approval of military intervention. Thus, while most policy votes will require a simple majority of the General Assembly, approving armed conflict will require 2/3 of the General Assembly and the support of the Security Council. Conversely, granting sovereignty and peacekeeping missions will only require the support of 1/3 of the General Assembly. These changes could eliminate the institutionalized dominance of the P-5 and the decreased threshold for sovereignty will further allow colonized peoples to make their own decisions. This comes from the value of self-determination and the goal of allowing all people to have a real opportunity to hold the key to their own future.

A short note about reapportionment and democracy

As you likely know, the decennial census counts the population of each state and distributes seats given to each state in the House of Representatives for the next decade. The census purports to do this proportionally. However, the data show that this is not done proportional enough, at least not to meet our modern conception of democracy.

The 2010 census has told us that the most populous state is California with 36,961,664 people. As such, the state has been given 53 representatives in the House. Wyoming is the least populous state with 544,270 people, getting only 1 representative in the House. Thus, in the House, Wyoming has 544,270 people per vote while California has 697,390 people per vote. Each representative’s vote in the House is equal. As such, 544,270 Wyomingites are equal to 697,390 Californians. Wyomingites have 1.28 times greater voice than Californians in the House. Following that formulation, in the Electoral College Wyomingites have 3.64 times greater voice than Californians do; 2.8 times less democratic than the House!

            What’s worse is the Senate. Now, the whole reason for the Senate is to give each state equal voice in the federal government. The original Constitution gave the power to appoint Senators to the state legislatures, meaning the voice being distributed was quite literally to the states, not the people. Due to the 17^th Amendment, we now popularly elect senators. Since each state gets 2 senators Wyomingites get 67.9 times greater voice than Californians in the Senate!

It’s clear that the structure of our bicameral national legislature favors less populous, usually agrarian states. This is unsurprising considering the mostly rural past of this country. But just like all of electoral engineering issues there are trade-offs and big political implications.

·         Without giving the least populated states inflated power, California and a few other large states could dominate national politics. However, one could counter that those states deserve to benefit from such domination; they have the population to back it up.  

·         Also, the least populous states often favor more conservative politics, likely giving Republicans unrepresentative power on Election Day.

·         Pork projects and subsidies are currently often found in states with low populations; think Bridge to Nowhere and Ethanol subsidies.

Lastly, note that the Constitution only reads, “[t]he Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative…” In 1790 the U.S. population was 3,929,214, and the 1787 document allots for 65 representatives, giving 60,449 people per representative. In 2010 the national population is 307,006,550. However, the number of representatives has remained constant at 435 since the passage of the Permanent Apportionment Act of 1929. Thus, we now have 705,762 people per representative.

My purpose for pointing out such numbers is to show that each generation must look at the decisions made by generations past We must recognize that the old adage of ‘one person, one vote’, is overly simplistic and misleading. If the spirit of the saying was ever true, it certainly isn’t now. Note that gerrymandering and corruption needn’t be invoked. In the final analysis, the only thing holding our nation to our skewed system is ourselves.