Diagramming Public Diplomacy, ver. 2.0

My previous post on this concept was almost purposely not thought-out. After I ran the idea by a few professors, colleagues, and fellow bloggers, I feel better that this diagram is an elegant way to represent the basic relationships which involve public diplomacy.

Below the important institutions are represented by boxes; governments and non-governments. The first group is limited to Westphalian states, where I will ignore federal systems for simplicity. The second includes pretty much anything that isn’t a Westphalian state. That includes individual people, NGOs, corporations, interest groups, etc. We’ll call them publics for short.

(It is worth noting that is diagram is unintentionally similar to one discussed in: McDowell, Mark. "Public Diplomacy at the Crossroads: Definitions and Challenges in and 'Open Source' Era". The Flectcher Forum of World Affairs. Vol. 32:3 Special Edition 2008. Great minds think alike!)

            Communication between these institutions is shown by double-sided arrows. This is showing the two-way symmetrical communication that—in theory—occurs. Thus, the communication between governments is traditional diplomacy. This usually consists of state visits, summits, and diplomats communicating to each other. The arrows from a government to its people is called public affairs in the U.S. federal system (as well as many state systems), and simply is how publics communicate with their government, and vice versa.

Finally, we get to the good stuff: public diplomacy. The three remaining arrows are under the label of public diplomacy.

The diagonal arrows show the communication that occurs between governments and foreign publics. This occurs through official educational and professional exchange programs, cultural and tourism promotion, etc. from the government end. But, as this is a two-way model, how do publics communicate with a foreign government? I suppose by expressing opinions on the internet and demonstrations when foreign heads of state visit.

The last arrow shows the communication that occurs between publics of different Westphalian states. This occurs with private-funded exchanges, tourism, popular culture, commerce, migration, etc. In public diplomacy, much of this communication is not direct; it goes through the news media. Things such as the ‘CNN Effect’ or now the ‘Al Jazeera Effect’ influence these relationships by providing more indirect communication between publics and foreign governments or publics than there would likely be direct communication otherwise.

Now, it must be admitted that relying on the Westphalian state is a Euro-centric approach. Note that whether the communication is between a Westphalian state and foreign publics, or just two foreign (to each other) publics, it still is considered public diplomacy. There remains, however, an actual question of Euro-centricity: If two groups communicate—which do not qualify as Westphalian states, but nonetheless traditionally hold themselves as traditional sovereign nations—is that considered public diplomacy? For example, we have two tribes whose laws, traditions, values, etc. are quite different from one another and both consider their tribal leaders as their only source of civil authority. These tribes could either both be in places like eastern Sudan, Afghanistan, Oceania, or the Americas. Assuming neither tribe qualifies as a Westphalian state and both exist within the same Westphalian state, would communications between tribal leaders be considered traditional diplomacy? Would communication between a tribal leader and the people of the other tribe, or communication between the people of both tribes, be considered public diplomacy? While a strict application of my graph would answer in the negative, I feel this is a grey area. As many concepts are necessarily fluid, I feel this presents the middle ground between intrastate cultural relations and public diplomacy.

This diagram does not aim to describe the tactics, goals, or effectiveness of any particular public diplomacy organization or objective. By creating it, I simply wish to communicate an easily understandable framework for the field, so as to avoid an overly lengthy piece which drones on about the boundaries of the field and the implications of those boundaries. Seeing that this blog post clearly failed in avoiding that, I only hope that the diagram helps to orient those foreign to the concept as well as clarify the goals of those most familiar with it.

Diagramming Public Diplomacy

Academically, public diplomacy must be a broad concept. There are many strategies, concepts, terms, and tactics that fit within the field. And just like any other academic field, there are aspects subject to concentration and specialization. That said, I still think the field would benefit from a consensus on a definition. The problem is that everyone else thinks so, too. There are more ‘What is Public Diplomacy?’ writing out there than anyone should read (including this post). Ultimately, we must be aware of the blurry lines that bind fields together.

So, I could simply offer up another definition of public diplomacy. I could write that public diplomacy is the image of a state or its people, as maintained by a government, organization, or people, and held by international publics. I could then go on for 500 words defending that definition. Or, I could just present a diagram, which I think is much more accurate, simple, and enjoyable.

Public Diplomacy

 The lines represent communication. Note that there are arrows on both sides, representing two-way communication. The rest speaks for itself. Are there other diagrams, graphs, or pictures representing public diplomacy? What do you think?

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2/3/11: I updated the discussion of this diagram. Check it out!

An intersection of law and public diplomacy? International defamation law

This is a summary and review of the article Should states have a legal right to reputation? Applying the rationales of defamation law to the international arena by Elad Peled. It appears in the Brooklyn Journal of International Law (35 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 107).

Summary:

In this law review article, Elad Peled explores the possibility of an internationally recognized right to state reputation. Despite the mouthful, the basic idea is pretty simple. Most individuals have limited knowledge of foreign states, and foreign affairs (pg. 11). Thus, the media significantly shapes the political positions a person holds in the arena of foreign policy (pg. 7). Also, public opinion of global actors may help shape a responsive government’s foreign policy (pg. 11). Indeed, “[s]ince the global phenomenon of democratization has increased governments' attention to their citizens' views regarding foreign policies, mass media and public opinion have come to play major roles in international politics” (pg. 7). As such, the perception of a foreign state impacts the choices of state’s officials regarding interactions with that foreign state (pg. 6).

Peled goes on to argue that states honor their international commitments because non-compliance to international norms and standards is damaging to their economic and foreign policy well being, as it would deter global actors from interacting with them (pg. 7, 9). But currently international publics may be wrongly informed of the compliance of states to such standards.  “[D]efamatory falsehoods reduce states' incentives to comply with international law, and render global decision-making less informed and, consequently, less efficient” (pg. 2). Thus, a statutory mechanism protecting state reputation would increase the efficiency of foreign policy and global politics (pg. 8).

Peled cites an international jurisprudential consensus on a crucial aspect of this possibility, stating, “…almost every state in the world has a civil or criminal law protecting individual and institutional reputation against defamation…” (pg. 2). Just as in other markets, market failures occur in the marketplace of ideas, and as such many feel regulation is appropriate. Peled assures us that this structure would only protect against factually inaccurate assertions of concrete events, and thus would not threaten damaging opinion or political rivals of any given state for mere dissent (pg. 3). Ultimately, Peled argues that such regulation is only justified if the benefits outweigh the costs, and that information must be reliably accurate in order to be valuable (pg. 10, 15).

Review

While it is important that such limitations on free speech remain restrained, this limitation may cover too few utterances to be effective and produce benefits sufficient to outweigh the costs. As many know from consuming media, there is a fine line between an assertion of fact and a mere opinion. For example, according to the National Park Service, “more than 110,000 men, women, and children” of Japanese decent were interned during World War II (http://www.nps.gov/manz/index.htm). What if a Japanese news agency were to report that “we believe that 150,000 people” were interned? Would it be actionable under this proposal? What if the news agency said “some have suggested that nearly 200,000” were interned? Would that be actionable? It seems unlikely, as neither of these statements present “inaccurate statements of fact depicting concrete events”, but merely statements of opinion (pg. 3). The amount of energy expended, political compromises hatched and sovereignty questions raised may not be worth outlawing such a narrow range of statements.

Moreover, I feel that one must question the sufficiency of this mechanism which aims to limit harm to states based on such false information. While reputation may be ultimately protected, truth may not. Inaccuracies which hurt a state would be punished, but inaccuracies which help a state would not. Thus, by bringing to international attention one type of falsity, this structure may implicitly give credence to an arguably congruent falsity: propaganda. However, we all learn in public diplomacy that positive news often simply is not news. So perhaps this may not have a much of a reputational impact as damaging news, but I feel it still would likely remain an important factor for consideration.

I find the possibility of protecting state reputation to be a fascinating idea. And while the reputation of a state is very important, a statutory structure such as this may not currently be the most efficient approach. The global arena is still considerable governed by anarchy, though the United Nations and other NGOs are trending our world into a more structured future. Until that world is reached, an institution charged with protecting state reputation will likely gain little response from states with inflexible definitions of sovereignty. Presently, it seems the best way to protect and maintain state reputation is the use of strategic public diplomacy, as there is still unrealized potential there.

A short note about reapportionment and democracy

As you likely know, the decennial census counts the population of each state and distributes seats given to each state in the House of Representatives for the next decade. The census purports to do this proportionally. However, the data show that this is not done proportional enough, at least not to meet our modern conception of democracy.

The 2010 census has told us that the most populous state is California with 36,961,664 people. As such, the state has been given 53 representatives in the House. Wyoming is the least populous state with 544,270 people, getting only 1 representative in the House. Thus, in the House, Wyoming has 544,270 people per vote while California has 697,390 people per vote. Each representative’s vote in the House is equal. As such, 544,270 Wyomingites are equal to 697,390 Californians. Wyomingites have 1.28 times greater voice than Californians in the House. Following that formulation, in the Electoral College Wyomingites have 3.64 times greater voice than Californians do; 2.8 times less democratic than the House!

            What’s worse is the Senate. Now, the whole reason for the Senate is to give each state equal voice in the federal government. The original Constitution gave the power to appoint Senators to the state legislatures, meaning the voice being distributed was quite literally to the states, not the people. Due to the 17^th Amendment, we now popularly elect senators. Since each state gets 2 senators Wyomingites get 67.9 times greater voice than Californians in the Senate!

It’s clear that the structure of our bicameral national legislature favors less populous, usually agrarian states. This is unsurprising considering the mostly rural past of this country. But just like all of electoral engineering issues there are trade-offs and big political implications.

·         Without giving the least populated states inflated power, California and a few other large states could dominate national politics. However, one could counter that those states deserve to benefit from such domination; they have the population to back it up.  

·         Also, the least populous states often favor more conservative politics, likely giving Republicans unrepresentative power on Election Day.

·         Pork projects and subsidies are currently often found in states with low populations; think Bridge to Nowhere and Ethanol subsidies.

Lastly, note that the Constitution only reads, “[t]he Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative…” In 1790 the U.S. population was 3,929,214, and the 1787 document allots for 65 representatives, giving 60,449 people per representative. In 2010 the national population is 307,006,550. However, the number of representatives has remained constant at 435 since the passage of the Permanent Apportionment Act of 1929. Thus, we now have 705,762 people per representative.

My purpose for pointing out such numbers is to show that each generation must look at the decisions made by generations past We must recognize that the old adage of ‘one person, one vote’, is overly simplistic and misleading. If the spirit of the saying was ever true, it certainly isn’t now. Note that gerrymandering and corruption needn’t be invoked. In the final analysis, the only thing holding our nation to our skewed system is ourselves.

The Over-Reaction to WikiLeaks

“If you want safety, peace, or justice work for competency, honesty, and transparency.”

Dr. Bill Corcoran

Politicians and commentators from across the country and across the aisle reacted worrisomely to the WikiLeaks cables released over the past months. From Congressman Peter King to the more legally nuanced position of Vice President Joe Biden, the word terrorism has been brought up in discussions of the actions of Assange & Co. Simply put: the American reaction to WikiLeaks tells the world more about America than the cables have. That reaction has been a dangerous one.

1.      Public Diplomacy

In general, Americans would like the world to view America as an ethical entity. Our foreign policy generally supports governments we feel are controlled by The People and the democratic peace theory is often a core assumption of our foreign policy. Recently the Obama Administration praised Google for standing up to China by refusing to censor search results. Several years ago the Bush administration condemned China’s treatment of political dissidents. After all, the President of the United States is the ‘Leader of the Free World’.

Despite this, America’s collective national knee-jerk reaction to WikiLeaks was to yell ‘terrorist!’ and to have the site shut down, as evidenced by reactions of Amazon, PayPal, MasterCard, etc. In terms of maintaining trusting relationships, honesty and staying true to one’s values are best practices. This goes for personal relationships and inter-governmental relationships alike. How America’s public and private sectors react to journalists show the world what America values. We as a people can’t condemn China for silencing whistleblowers and dissidents when our own corporations and politicians are trying to stamp them out as well. We must realize that if we wish the world to value openness in governance, we too must value it.

2.      Civil Liberties

The labeling of WikiLeaks as a terrorist organization is worrying. WikiLeaks has simply published material, the veracity of which the government has not denied, against the interest and wishes of the government. It’s true that material has been classified, but the simple fact that no actually crucial or important security information has been leaked is proof that this material was not deserving of such a designation in a government of The People. If a legal case against WikiLeaks were to be successful, no organization or individual would publish leaked material, denying citizens that rare glimpse into a government that is supposedly run by them.

 The 1^st Amendment to our constitution reads, in part, "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press..." While that right has never been absolute, the language of the text and the case law which has followed hold high the burden on the government when attempting to act against journalism. This is partially because journalism and whistleblowing like WikiLeaks is actually a social benefit. Democracy only works in the world of perfect information: every voter has all the information he/she needs to make the best choice in the voting booth. However, without things like the Pentagon Papers or WikiLeaks, voters would have little knowledge of what the government is doing. Thus, there needs to be a vocal critic of the government, ready to report mistakes and to publish information otherwise unavailable to voters.

We as a people should condemn the actions and statements of our politicians and corporations as attempts to silence a legitimate whistleblower. Our government and our people must apply the principles of our founding to be viewed legitimately abroad and to protect our liberties at home.