Seven Mistakes of English that make me instantly stop listening or reading

Insensitive? Possibly. Arbitrary? Maybe. Steeped in privilege and arcane notions of propriety? Sure. But regardless, for some elitist reason I cannot get past these commonly made mistakes in English. Whether others have the same rules and pet peeves as I, everyone will judge you in some way for how you speak. And believe it or not, you judge them, too.

1.       Pronouns are for back-up. Only use ‘it’, ‘they’, ‘them’, etc. when that which is being referred to is explicitly clear.

2.       Proper verb conjugation. There’s two? No, there are two. This one is so simple, I really don't understand the issue here.

3.       Adjectives v. adverbs. He didn’t run slow. Don’t grab your coat quick. He ran slowly. Grab your coat quickly. File ‘well v. good’ under this, too.

4.       Their and They. These words always refer to more than one person. They are NOT gender neutral singular pronouns.

5.       Correct plurals. Criteria are many, criterion is one. Media are plural. Data are too. Alumni are as well. (Bonus: ‘alum’, unless you’re discussing chemistry, is not a word. Never use it. Ever.)

6.       Sentence subjects. ‘Checked the door’. ‘Wasn’t there’. Uh, what checked the door? What wasn’t there? Even if you think the subjects of these incomplete sentences are made clear by previous reference, they are not. You need a subject here.

7.       I and Me, Who and Whom. I and Who are subjects, Me and Whom are objects. Use them as such.

Now of course I have made all of these mistakes at some point in my adult life, but once I notice I feel dirty and embarrassed. How can one notice mistakes and thereby improve one’s English? There are two ways to notice mistakes: having an ‘ear’ for correct English, and knowing the formal rules of English. The former simply means having your Colbert-gut attuned to recognize mistakes, while the latter is the nerd version which will note that a coordinating conjunction should only be used to join two independent clauses. If you didn’t grow up with parents who used near-perfect English (I love my parents but they know nothing of grammar), the best way to develop and ‘ear’ for it is to read it and listen to it. If you didn’t have grammar education in high school (I must admit I did), buy this. 

Regardless of what technological advances come (except perhaps direct thought propagation) language will continue to be important. And until human nature changes, people will continue to judge others on how they speak. The criteria, though, will change, of course. Like education in general, language is a lifetime process that requires constant attention, but for me it has been well worth the effort.

Who's to Blame For the Surveillance State? Here's the Hard Truth

This post appears on PolicyMic.com and thus can be found here.

Americans are told that the United States is a nation governed by laws, not men. We praise our peaceful transitions of power and our checks and balances. But while we are not ruled by the arbitrary whims of individuals, our laws are not actually what dictate our government’s actions. Instead, we are a nation governed by fear of terrorism. This has led us down a foggy road, opaque with tactically questionable and illegal National Security Administration (NSA) surveillance. Now, our best chance of bringing transparency back to the U.S. is to work within the political system to bring real change to law and policy.

Recent leaks, information releases, and other revelations have shown that Americans have no information about the actions of our own government. Specifically, the NSA’s "metadata’" program of compiling massive databases of information on both domestic and foreign communications is inconsistent with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which was passed to prevent the executive branch from engaging in over-broad domestic surveillance. In order to achieve such a database, the NSA has co-opted complicittelecommunications companies, as well. All the metadata collected could not possibly be relevant to any specific investigation, allowing the executive to unlawfully engage in the collection of personal information on U.S. citizens.

FISA itself is flawed as well. The U.S. legal system is designed to be adversarial: two opposing parties attempting to point out holes in the other’s arguments. In theory, this process allows for the truth to be discovered by the judge or jury. The FISA court does not generally work this way, however. The government presents classified information to the court, with no effective oversight beyond that the government has “simply dotted its i’s and crossed its t’s.” Thus, with no opposing counsel or public scrutiny, the nation’s national security apparati are allowed to operate unchecked by any truly independent body or individual. We now know that in October 2011, U.S. District Judge Bates wrote that the NSA acquires information with “substantial intrusions on Fourth Amendment protected interests.” Internal executive branch checks are not constitutionally or democratically sufficient oversight for programs such as surveillance and drone operations.

Those who point out the dangers of this lack of transparency and public scrutiny of our surveillance programs are not simply clinging to outdated notions of rights and liberties. In the name of the American people, the NSA has also hacked into the United Nations and the European Union. Along with these supra-national organizations, our spying programs have strained our relationship with Germany, a key economic ally. Perhaps more troubling, the very structure of these surveillance programs give officials no sufficient ability to separate purely domestic communications from those which involve non-U.S. citizens. In fact, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is using NSA-like legal tactics to collect NSA-like metadata for domestic law enforcement purposes.

America is now living in a time period when citizens are being knowingly surveilled. This is Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon — an institution with a ubiquitous and controlling gaze. Michel Foucault pointed out that living in knowing surveillance leads humans to internalize the institutional rules — that is to say, we begin to act as our surveillers wish us to act. We grow numb to the invasions of personal privacy and accept our role within the state apparatus. This does not sound like a democracy where citizens exert ultimate control and authority over the functions and actions of the government.

I wish to alter Julian Assange’s statement, “privacy for the weak and transparency for the powerful,” to say instead, privacy for the people and transparency for the state. This statement reflects a truth which can be inferred by the philosophy, structure, and very texts of our Constitution. Regarding privacy for the people: the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure, the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and the Ninth Amendment protection of personal freedoms. Regarding transparency for the state: the First Amendment freedom of the press, the president’s Article II duty to report on the state of the nation, and the democratic requirement that the people must make informed decisions when voting for or against government officials. Privacy for the people and transparency for the state are requirements to ensure government is subservient to the people who established it.

Whistleblowers like Chelsea Manning, Edward Snowden, John Kiriakou, and others have taken extralegal steps to bring government abuses to the attention of the public. These revelations have not yet inspired mass action in the American people — save, perhaps, for the Restore the Fourth movement . Thus, the American people must be mobilized in order to create a sustained push for sufficient transparency in governance to ensure the protection of our constitutional rights. As Congress returns to work for the fall session, citizens must exponentially increase our activism toward forcing a revolution in how the government conducts its surveillance activities. Without constituents in the streets and anger in their inboxes, our representatives have no incentive to challenge the current national security structure.

But we cannot continue to only work on the outside looking in. We must work within the political system in order to effectively bring change to the U.S. The wholesale structural change needed in the federal government to roll back the privacy abuses of the past cannot come without more allies within the halls of power. Think to yourself, which movement has brought more change to the U.S. political landscape: the Tea Party or Occupy Wall Street? The Tea Party did, by recognizing how to play the game of politics to get what they want. As such, formalized organizations which can either put forth or endorse political candidates for federal office must be created and supported broadly.

Walking down the opaque road of secretive governance and diminished liberty should strike each of us as inherently un-American. But you can’t challenge the government unless you challenge yourself. You can’t change the country unless you change yourself. As Cory Booker said in a speech in Washington on Saturday, democracy is not a spectator sport. We each must materially support nationwide organizations which have the structural ability to move Washington toward a more perfect America. In the words of Lt. Ehren Watada, this is an obligation, not a choice.

Egypt's Experts Propose a Constitution — and It's Not a Good Start

This post was written in my capacity as Research Associate for the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, and can be found here.

The 10-person expert committee charged with making recommendations for a new or revised Egyptian constitution finished its task this week. The draft constitution will now head to a larger, 50-person committee for further review or changes before being sent to be voted on by the Egyptian people. While other recommended changes, such as those regarding gender equality, application of sharia, and the nature of political parties, get more attention, the design of the legislature will be the focus of this article. Despite the committee being composed of law professors and judges, the proposed new structure is not only remarkably simplistic, it is unimaginative. The recommended changes are also ill-suited for the realities of Egypt, and if they are retained by the larger committee and affirmed by the people, they could lead to long-term trouble for the country’s political landscape.

The unicameral, majoritarian structure of the legislature lacks imagination. It is simply the oldest and perhaps least democratic design the committee could have selected. By "least democratic," I mean it will likely seat politicians in proportions that are not reflective of the will of the people. As Zaid al-Ali has written before, there will likely be no legal revolution in Egyptian elections or legislative structures.

There are two main problems with the selected majoritarian system: manipulation and representation. First, a geography-dependent system can easily fall victim to partisan gerrymandering. Outside the U.S. context, gerrymandering was heavily used in South Africa before 1994. Next, representation is often skewed in most majoritarian elections. Of particular concern in Egypt must be the Christian minority. With only roughly 10% of the population, Christians will be hard-pressed to get elected in any districts where they are not a plurality of the population, as garnering 10% of the vote in a majoritarian district awards a candidate zero power. In a proportional system, however, 10% of the vote would gain a party 10% of the power, generally. Further, experience shows that most majoritarian systems structurally disadvantage female representation — an oversight Egypt cannot afford. This system will give power only to those who can garner a majority of support in each district, which risks the disenfranchisement of the many smaller political factions which exist in Egypt. I have recommended before that the committee find a more inclusive political structure for such a divided society. 

Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of the current situation is that there are so many less flawed systems from which the committee could have chosen. Egypt’s previous constitution featured a mixed systemwhereby one-third of the representatives were elected by first-past-the-post and two-thirds were elected by proportional representation (PR). While some might recommend pure PR in divided societies, such a system precludes both geographic representation and the creation of an individual accountability nexus between citizens and their legislators.

The system I'd propose for Egypt would be a proportional representation system with open provincial lists. In such a system, each of Egypt’s 27 provinces would have open lists featuring local candidates. This would require each party contesting in a given province to present a list of local, party-approved candidates. The number of seats given to each province would be proportional to their populations. This system would allow for individuals from each province to be represented in Cairo without the concern of gerrymandering (so long as the provincial boundaries remain) while still creating multi-member districts in which women and political and religious minorities have real chances for meaningful representation. This system’s open lists would allow voters to have control over which individuals are seated, thus increasing party transparency and helping to ensure that those seated are truly selected by the people they represent.

While my suggestion is by no means the only good solution, it seems the experts chose the worst one. A pure majoritarian system will give disproportionate representation to larger parties and to the parties that can organize and mobilize best. Ironically, assuming that neither are functionally banned, the likely beneficiaries of such a system are the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party and the National Democratic Party of former President Mubarak. While a constitution alone does not make a democracy, a poorly written constitution can severely cripple one. Egyptians, unfortunately, know this better than most.

The Obama Effect in the Arab World

This academic paper was written for the Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy. The PDF of the paper can be found here.


Abstract:

This paper tests the Obama Effect hypothesis with respect to the Arab World. The paper first presents the popular uses of the term and then discusses the thin scholarly literature on the topic. For quantitative data, the paper uses longitudinal data from the Annual Public Opinion Poll from 2004 to 2011, with supplemental data from the Pew Research Center. Furthermore, the paper analyzed data on the Arab Spring in the context of a possible Obama Effect and policy implications for the future of U.S. foreign policy. The paper found insufficient support for the hypothesis due to a lack of theoretical foundation or statistical support in the Arab world. It should be noted that this study was limited due to the lack of survey questions tailored to test this specific hypothesis. Lastly, the paper made suggestions for future U.S. foreign policy in the Arab world as well as for future research.

Four Recommendations for Egypt’s Constitutional Process

This post, written in my capacity as Research Associate for the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, can be found here.


Ten legal experts—six senior judges and four well-known constitutional law professors—have been given only one month to work on the daunting task of amending the existing constitution. The interim president’s constitutional advisor stated that these legal experts comprise the sole authority capable of officially proposing amendments to the constitution; outside groups and the general public have only one week to offer suggestions to the committee. Thereafter, a larger committee, intended to be representative of the varied social and political groups of Egypt, will have two months to review the proposed changes and consider the entirety of the document before it is put up for a national referendum. 

This accelerated constitutional process puts Egypt at an important moment in history, one where it must both reconcile the conflicts of the past and create the legal structures for the future. These are two inter-related, but ultimately distinct, challenges. Egyptian power brokers must rebuild and legitimize institutions such as the presidency, the legislature, and the judiciary in order to prevent the conflicts that brought Egypt to June 30 in the first place. To best ensure that mass protests do not fill Tahrir again in 2014, the constitutional drafters should learn the lessons of otherconstitutional experiences, such as those of South Africa and Cambodia, which can help guide Egypt forward. 

First, it is encouraging that from the beginning of the most recent process, the military has pledged to put the constitution to a popular referendum before parliamentary elections occur. Public participation in the constitutional process, however, seems to be again lacking. This was amajor flaw in both the writing of Egypt’s 2012 constitution and in Cambodia’s constitutional experience—a lesson from which the current government seems not to have learned. The Egyptian street must feel that its voice has been heard by any government hoping to claim legitimacy. However, all of the members of the committees involved in the constitutional process have been (or will be) appointed by the interim government. Though the government’s constitutional declaration requires that the committees have a broadly representative, technocratic membership, the Egyptian people have not had direct input in this important part of the process. 

Second, the new constitution must allow for power-sharing. That is, in addition to involvement in the creation of a new government, all groups must also have a stake in its success. The current process suffers from a lack of participation by the Muslim Brotherhood and many related entities; these groups represent an important segment of Egyptian society that isrefusing to recognize the new government. Without all major political actors on board, conflict will likely continue, and the Brotherhood may become a spoiler to future governance processes. Indeed, the organization has said before that negotiations cannot progress without Morsi’s reinstatement as the president, an obvious non-starter for both the military and those who took to the streets on June 30. 

Of course, getting the current governing factions and Islamists to submit to the same institutional constraints will not be an easy task. If representatives from groups like the Muslim Brotherhood/FJP or the Nour Party are ultimately included in the larger constitutional committee, then the likelihood for wide consensus around issues like gender quotas and the role of sharia would decrease. This can be acceptable; as such political questions are more properly sorted out after representatives are duly elected. Leaving such questions to the legislature can help to encourage capacity-building within parties seeking legislative seats; it also limits the number of up-front tasks involved in constitution building. 

There are limits to what should be able to be compromised, of course.Unlike the previous constitution, which was largely written by Islamists, the new document must include sufficient human rights protections for all Egyptians, including religious minorities and women. Moreover, the powerful executive office that Morsi created must not be allowed to remain. Real legislative checks over the presidency, in addition to promoting good governance, would allow more Egyptians to feel that their voices are being heard in the halls of government. Along these lines, it is important to note that the small “expert committee” charged with amending the present constitution contains no women, though the yet-to-be-named fifty-person committee must include “ten members [representing] young people and women.”

The third recommendation is that the military, the current government, and the new constitution must ensure that democracy is “the only game in town.” To do so, they must marginalize violence and clearly denote extra-constitutional governmental actions as unacceptable. In short, all actors must respect the rule of law.  The constitution must also make available effective avenues for the people’s voices not only to be heard but also to be  translated into institutional transfers of power—such avenues include citizen initiatives, referenda, and other forms of direct democracy. Transitional justice is also an immensely important task, especially as calls for Friday demonstrations increase. Real options, such as truth commissions, an independently-administered media watchdog organization, and national dialogues should be kept open for exploration. Processes must be created to help reconcile the deep divisions created among all Egyptians who have been victimized by the extremist politics of the past several years. While it would appear Mohamed Amin al-Mahdy has been given this task as Minister of Transitional Justice and National Reconciliation, his mandate and scope of duties remain unclear."

Lastly, real local governance should be created in Egypt. Presently,governors are appointed by the president, and they are often retired members of the military or police. Governors, municipal council members, and city mayors should be elected and given effective abilities to govern. Such decentralization of power would allow for local governments to provide more directly for their people, possibly allowing some of the many pressing political questions in Egypt to be addressed separately by smaller groups of Egyptians. Political decentralization would also likely result in economic decentralization, thereby decreasing the power of both the executive and the military’s “deep state” and  increasing the influence of average Egyptians. The lack of local political and economic power is arguably one of the reasons Egyptians have been flocking mainly to Tahrir and some regional centers in the first place—they have nowhere else to go to express frustration. 

If heeded, these recommendations could help Egypt prevent a recurrence of their recent experiences. It is important for the current government to remember that democracy does not simply equal elections, a reality that Morsi failed to acknowledge during his time as president. Democratization requires elite consensus on legitimacy, a culture that accepts politics (not force) as the method of determining power, and respect for the rule of law. However Egypt meets these challenges and answers these questions, one thing is clear: in the end, any successful solution must be a purely Egyptian one.