Assured Dysfunction: Egypt’s Parliamentary Constituencies Law

This post can also be found at the Atlantic Council.

Earlier this week Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi approved a law to govern the upcoming parliamentary elections, presently scheduled to occur “before the end of March 2015.” The law creates an electoral system which is overly complex, marginalizes political parties, and allows for easy government manipulation. 

In accordance with Article 102 of the Egyptian Constitution, the law calls for the House of Representatives to include 567 members: 120 members chosen from closed party lists, 420 individuals elected by geographic districts, and 27 member appointed by the president. Each elected official will serve a 5-year term. 

Regarding the 120 seats chosen from closed party lists, Egypt will be divided into four large geographic regions. Each party will have a separate list with candidates from each region. The final 120 members must include at least 24 Christians, 21 females, 8 Egyptians living abroad, and 8 handicapped persons. Regarding the 420 individuals, they will be elected as independents from 237 electoral districts. Of those districts, 83 will elect a single representative, 123 will elect two, and 30 will elect three representatives. Presidential spokesperson Alaa Youssef stated that each elected member would “represent equal segments of the electorate.” 

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TIMELINE June 9: The Parliamentary Election Law is issued by then-interim President Adly Mansour. December 8: The Electoral Districts Committee sent the bill to the cabinet for approval of the proposed 231 electoral districts. December 10: Egypt’s cabinet approved the bill and sent it to the State Council. December 15: the State Council increased the number of independent constituencies to 237 and approved the law. December 16: The High Electoral Commission approved the law. December 22: President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi approved the law.

This electoral system, like others of Egypt’s past, is complicated. The presence of a parallel voting system, similar to that of the 2012 constitution, is not by itself overly complicated. It is used in countries such as Japan and the Philippines. But a parallel voting system which includes new electoral districts of variable district magnitudes (the number of representatives elected in a given district) and four regional party lists is a lot to digest for any political community, especially one which has seen several new constitutions and heads of state within the past four years. The political process, for voters and parties, of learning the incentives of new electoral structure will be gradual, and will be based more on experiences from previous elections than detailed analyses of the current law. 

The benefits of the system’s complication, however, are not sufficient. Regarding district magnitude, only 30 districts will elect three candidates and 80 will elect only one, with the majority electing just two. These variations in district magnitude could have different effects on strategic voting, how centrist or extreme the elected representatives are, and to what extent elected officials deviate from the desires of voters. While each elected official will represent about 131,000 voters, Egyptians in different electoral districts will be asked to vote and think in different ways. As such, Egyptian in districts which are physically much smaller in cities like Cairo and Alexandria will vote differently than Egyptians in physically larger districts in the desert and in Upper Egypt. Generally, the simultaneous use of a majoritarian system in parallel with a proportional system is motivated by the desire to mitigate the drawbacks of each. However, it is unclear if this goal is actually achieved in practice. 

The marginalization of the political influence of parties by restricting them from participating in the majoritarian contests could be one such goal. Only 120 of 567 members of the legislature are allowed to carry the banner of a party. Even if all 120 proportionally-allotted seats were won by a single party, no governing legislative majority would be possible in order to present a unified voice to challenge the political power of the presidency. This was likely a desired result of those who crafted the electoral law: parties are given far fewer seats than they were during the late-2011 through early-2012 legislative elections which were dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. The past electoral strength of Muslim Brotherhood has likely turned the present government sour to political parties, thus leading to a conscious decision to marginalize their potential strength within electoral politics. Nonetheless, the Conference Party supports the law, and theWafd Party, the Reform and ‎Development Party, Egyptian Front, and Democratic Alliance will participate in the election, with many expressing criticism of the law. Both the Egyptian Social Democratic Party and al Dostour Party have opposed the law. 

A related, though distinct, decision which strengthens the present government’s hand is the prevalence of geographically-based representatives. Farid Zahran of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party expressed concern the government might gerrymander, engaging in the splintering and packing of opposition-heavy geographic areas. Zahran is right to be concerned: the drawing of electoral districts by a unitary, partisan body is the easiest way to manipulate the results of an election while maintaining the veil of legitimacy. Moreover, these elections are particularly important as the first parliamentary plebiscite under the 2014 constitution, as they will set the precedent of electoral behavior in all future elections. 

This law creates the need for both voters and parties to perform complex political calculus, nearly eliminates the ability for any party to form a legislative coalition, and gives the government an unchecked ability to draw electoral lines. In the context of a strong executive as both enshrined in the 2014 constitution and as seen in practice, this law assures that Egypt’s legislature will be too dysfunctional and manipulable to act as a legitimate check on executive power. 

Egypt’s New Terrorism Law

The original can be found at the Atlantic Council here.

Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al Sisi approved a new terrorism law earlier this month. While disturbing, the law is not surprising when viewed in the context of Egypt’s consistent rhetoric of its war against terror. With the Egyptian militant organization Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis recently pledging allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the threat is real. The recently passed law, however, comes at a high cost. 

First, the terrorism law is deeply flawed, as it is overly vague and allows legal culpability for constitutionally-protected actions. According to Article 1 of the new law, “a terrorist entity is any group which disrupts public order or threatens the safety, security or interests of society, or harms or frightens individuals or threatens their lives, freedoms, rights or security or harms national unity…” Here, any organization that the Egyptian government claims has ‘disrupted public order,’ ‘threatens the interests of society,’ ‘frightens individuals,’ or ‘harms national unity’ can be labeled a terrorist organization. In reality, any organization which publicly expresses displeasure with the social or political status quo in Egypt could foreseeably fall into one of these categories. 

The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies criticized the potential designation as a terrorist entity any group which calls “through any means to stop a specific law or overturn a court verdict,” noting that such wording could include peaceful political expression. Free expression is guaranteed in Article 65 of Egypt’s constitution. This law, however, empowers the government to label organizations which peacefully and constructively express political or social opposition as terrorists. In practice, this law could be used to silence, for example, organizations calling for protests against the verdict in which charges were dropped against ousted president Hosni Mubarak.

Second, the law gives the executive branch of the Egyptian government potentially damaging power over the rights of Egyptians with no or insufficient due process. The government first has the right to dissolve, freeze the assets of, and arrest the members of an organization designated as a terrorist entity in a manner discussed above. Under Article 74 of the Egyptian constitution, a political party can only be dissolved by a court judgment. The government can also create a listof terrorist entities (Article 2) and a list of national security threats (Article 5). In short, the executive branch, security forces, and the public prosecution are empowered to identify and eliminate terrorist organizations by ending the organizations’ activities and seizing their property. 

Missing from the bill is any judicial or legislative involvement, and no requirements of evidence are to be submitted to any independent reviewer. While groups areallowed to appeal decisions labelling them terrorist entities, the label itself allows wholesale removal of all political, property, and monetary rights, which would only be restored if the appeal were successful—a process which the law itself allows to take up to three years. Effectively, the Egyptian government can unilaterally remove all functional rights from any organization without having to present any evidence of its claims for three years, potentially violating constitutional Article 54’s due process requirements for restricting rights and freedoms.

When considering the political context of this law, is important to remember that Egypt does face legitimate terrorism threats, primarily but not exclusively in Sinai. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis has been a thorn in the side of every Egyptian government since 2011 and shows no sign of stopping. The Egyptian people have legitimate fears of violence which any government would have to address. 

However, laws which combat terrorism but still allow for free political expression exist both within Egypt and around the world. Article 237 of Egypt’s constitution, for example, allows the government to combat terrorism, but cannot logically be inferred to violate the free expression guarantees of the same document while maintaining consistency. The removal of all rights from peaceful and lawful organizations will not defeat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, and the Muslim Brotherhood has already been prevented from functioning, had its assets frozen, and has been declared a terrorist organization. The terrorist entities law is yet another example of legislation passed by the Egyptian authorities which aim to restrict public space. It joins the so-called NGO law, which has given the Egyptian state regulatory authority over NGO funding and activity, and a restrictive protest law requiring that the ministry of interior receive prior notification of all demonstrations.

In the context of these previous legal actions, the goal of Egypt’s new terrorism law appears to be to suffocate the country’s civil society by granting the government the ability to eliminate any group it sees fit without providing evidence or reasoning. The ambiguous wording also affords it the opportunity to silence critics, activists, and journalists. This will chill any attempts to present alternatives to the political or social status quo, which is a key function of civil society and a free media in a liberal democratic society. 

Explaining America: #BlackLivesMatter and CIA Torture

One of the hats I wear is a teacher of English as a new language, mostly to new Americans. They all came here for a reason—for a better shot at happiness—and as such generally have a personal stake in the American Dream not only being a reality, but having room for them and their children, as well.

In order to present a full picture of the United States, however, I try to allow the students to draw their own conclusions from the country’s past: our relations with Native Americans, our Founding, our reactions to the various waves of immigrants, the history of slavery and its role in our governmental development, and the Women’s Rights, Civil Rights, and Gay Rights movements. The 2000 presidential election, for example, is a great lesson on our respect for governance institutions. I try to highlight the pressures and interests which explain what seems bad about American history and note the asterisks which often follow what seems good about American history.

In previous months, I have been asked questions which lead to teachable moments. An individual burning a Quran in Florida leads to a wonderful discussion of free speech and the path of 1^st Amendment litigation during the 20^th Century and where it stands today. A discussion on curbing climate change leads to a mention of the Kyoto Protocol, and therefore a lesson on the concept of dualism in international law. The controversies surrounding the Affordable Care Act can lead to an important lesson on federalism.

This past month has been different. Sure, the grand jury verdict regarding the death of Michael Brown led to a discussion about evidence and the presumption of innocence, but the verdict following the death of Eric Garner made the previous lesson feel hollow. Of course the CIA Torture Report can bring to the fore the separation of powers, but the existence of such programs which are so obviously “contrary to our values” is difficult to present in a non-judgmental way.

I love my country. I view America as a good literary protagonist: she has a complex past and she does make mistakes, but she’s affable and fundamentally good. These terrible news stories, however, have made explaining America more difficult and more troubling. Are Jim Crow and Korematsu really just skeletons in America’s closet, or are they examples of her deep flaws which she refuses to address? December 2014 suggests the latter.

The beauty and frustration of a federal republic is that no single institution can address these flaws alone. But America’s story is not over: We The People must actively engage in all levels of governance in order to write the chapter that we wish to read. Looking forward to 2015, I hope we write for America a better future, so when it eventually becomes the past itself, the job of explaining America will be an easy one.

Simplistic and Orientalist: How Atheists Attack Religion

Over the past month a refreshed debate between atheism and Islam has been raging in the Anglosphere. While hardly new—Atheists have been intellectually attacking religion in general and Islam in particular since 9/11—this debate has intensified since the exploits of the “Islamic State” have given rise to a new brand of religiously-inspired violence which has terrified much of the West. Bill Maher, Reza Aslan, Ben Affleck and Sam Harris have been the most high-profile participants in this debate by shouting past each other on television.

But while religion genuinely has much to answer for regarding its place in and contribution to the modern world, much of the criticism by the so-called New Atheists has been simplistic and Orientalist—offending many and leaving others unconvinced.

An atheistic point of view

For those who view religion and religious belief as outsiders, it is clear that there are many troubling features of religiosity which seem antiquated at best and dangerous at worst. For example, one of the many objections to religion by Western seculars is the jailing of people like Jabeur Mejri or the repeated attacks and calls for murder against Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard. Both men merely posted depictions of the Prophet Mohamed. Indeed, the mocking or disrespect of any idea should never be met by the threat of physical or legal force. The schoolyard rule remains true here: words are fought with words, and only physical attacks, or the imminent threat thereof, warrant physical responses.

When attempting to discredit religiously based actions, atheists generally ignore arguments of moral relativism and instead argue in favor of universal human rights: protections for free expression, blasphemy, apostasy, and other actions which have been claimed to violate various religious traditions such as homosexuality and a denunciation of gender roles. While some see religion as the source of the conception of universal human rights, atheists find no need for religion here either, and instead find secular sources of human rights.

In the face of violent actions which are claimed to be religiously motivated, many mainstream theists (not to use moderate) attempt to distance themselves from the perpetrators thereof. However, when peaceful adherents of a religion state that violent adherents are not actually following the faith, they are engaging in a no true Scotsman argument which merely pits their interpretation of ancient texts against that of their co-religionists, whom often similarly denounces the pacifism or tolerance of the mainstream.

Reza Aslan tells us that often both the violent and peaceful versions of religion can often be validated by interpretations of the same religious text. As such, deciding who ‘truly’ represents the religion is often a fruitless and impossible task. In defending religion, Aslan states,

People of faith insert their values into their Scriptures, reading them through the lens of their own cultural, ethnic, nationalistic and even political perspectives... If you are a violent misogynist, you will find plenty in your scriptures to justify your beliefs. If you are a peaceful, democratic feminist, you will also find justification in the scriptures for your point of view.

So the pious judge religion by their previously-held views, they do not judge their views by their previously-held religion. If this is so, then it is clear that secular foundations of understanding what is right and wrong are the initial sources of our values, and only later do we mold religion to fit that understanding. It has been clear for some time that religion is not a source of scientific knowledge, and Aslan seems to unavoidably imply that it is not a source of ethics, either.

Nietzsche may not have killed God, but Darwin and now Aslan have certainly neutered him, rendering impotent his follower’s claims of wisdom and social value.

Over simplified argumentation

Despite this seemingly strong intellectual foundation from which atheists can argue, their talking points have undermined their positions by being blatantly simplistic.

For example, whether reading about conflicts in the vast majority of human history or the contemporary Arab world, separating politics, religion, and economics is not only difficult, but it renders analysis nonsensical. Attempting to blame this war or that conflict on religion—or even claiming that certain atrocities would not have occurred sans religious motivation—is an illusory argument which engages in counter-factuals and an anachronistic view of human social organization, as most societies have not viewed these concepts as inherently separate. When even the “Islamic State” imposes a claimed “Islamic customs duty” at the edge of their controlled territory, the goals seem more financial than faithful.

Attempting to remove mixed and alternative motivations like individual variables in a physics experiment shows how much more complicated the human world can be than the physical world. If religion provided the only necessary motivation toward violence, then all religious people would be violent. Once another variable is admitted, the confidence in our conclusions must be questioned: is religion the driver and politics or nationalism or patriotism or xenophobia the passenger, or vice versa? This ambiguity shows that it is supremely foolish to conclude that religion is the source of all of our troubles.

Religion is not ‘off the hook’ for providing an excuse to systematically oppress women, nonbelievers, homosexuals, and others for a majority of human history, however. It simply must reasonably share the blame with other human fears, desires, motivations, and institutions.

The original sin of Orientalism

More insidious than poor reasoning is Orientalism. Herein the term will be used to mean a Western tendency and attempt to simplify, other, and impose external interpretations on Islam. While figures like Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, and Bill Maher have attacked Christianity and religion in general, Islam has been somewhat of an obsession of these vocal critics.

Harris argues that Islam is simply different: its falsehoods more false, its dangers more dangerous. Harris’s contention that modern terrorism flows from Islam dances dangerously close to belonging on Fox News—and is simply incorrect. But the criticism does not stop at an association with terrorism. “Islam breeds theocracy!” many Western atheists have claimed. Any more than Christianity? The goals and methods of Christians have been, both historically and presently, little different than the goals and methods of Muslims, and 34% of Americans want the United States to be a Christian theocracy. While the support for theocracy may be higher in many majority Muslim countries, it’s important to note that the difference is numerical, not categorical. Up until the 1960s Catholic Church had no requirement that non-Catholics be given rights to practice their religion, a guarantee found in the Quran and many historical interpretations thereof (though subject to the problems of interpretation mentioned above). “Islam is anti-democratic!” other Westerners have claimed. Less democratic than Catholicism, with its patriarchal, trans-national hierarchy which emphasizes lay obedience? Many questioned whether Catholic countries could become democratic back when they were the popular group to be othered.

Make no mistake, however: It is specifically Islam which is the object of derision from the New Atheists, not simply non-Western religions. Ignored has been the violence of Buddhists against Muslims, as well as Hindu attacks in India against Hindu female -Muslim male weddings. Just as religious people can justify their motives with religion, these prominent atheists justify their xenophobia toward Islam with critical argumentation. Islam is historically no aberration with respect to other religions on issues of tolerance and violence. Many of its adherents, however, have been the victims of historical and structural violence against their identity groups, the results of which they deal with daily. While there is no acceptable justification for offensive violent action, it is important to understand that this is a background to some of the violence in the Muslim world. Having empathy can allow one to see the broader social and political context in which violence in the name of Islam sometimes occurs. Given similar political and historical backgrounds, violence would find a similar audience within our society, as well. Such empathy would allow us to work with Muslims to mitigate the causes of these exacerbations of violence instead of only addressing their symptoms. But because we live in a post-9/11 world where many Anglophones are unfamiliar with the anthropological context of Islam, the religion of a growing number of those with whom we share our communities, attacking the entire Muslim world is an easy way to sell books and gain applause.

Suggestions for future discussions

Where does the conversation go from here, then? Here are four suggestions for analyzing the role of religion in society and dialogue between atheists and theists:

First, social commentators must take theists at their word when they state religion is the motivation for their actions. Yes, religion is a scapegoat for many, but to impose onto an actor our external ideas of what are his or her real motivations are is simply another form of imperialism. If someone is willing to kill or die for a belief, who are we to not take that person at his or her word, and to simply make presumptions about authenticity and intentions? If the societal value of religion is strong enough to inspire others to commit violence and act immorally, it is a social force worth critiquing. Nonetheless, be mindful about what implicit motivations might also exist: What are their stated goals? What are their methods of achieving those goals? What are the steps taken toward those goals?

Second, religion is simply an identity, which, like any other identity, breeds shared experience, exclusion, animosity, a sense of belonging, and social division. Reza Aslan writes, “As a form of identity, religion is inextricable from all the other factors that make up a person’s self-understanding, like culture, ethnicity, nationality, gender and sexual orientation.” Even Richard Dawkins has conceded that volunteers for the “Islamic State” sign-up more out of a sense of tribalism than religion. Political science has known for some time that divided societies are generally harder to govern than monolithic ones, and in that way the continued existence of religion presents a political challenge across the world.

Third, all beliefs, including democracy and Islam, must be criticized, defended, and mocked. This is because correct beliefs will be found through a free marketplace of ideas, wherein beliefs are attacked, allowing us to see if they are strongly grounded in reason. Otherwise, we would be engaging in censorship, allowing an authority to determine which beliefs are correct or incorrect. Stifling debate and the flow of beliefs artificially limits the scope of belief destruction and creation, impeding the progress of human thinking and innovation.

Fourth, atheists are generally literalists. Many atheists can only read texts, religious or otherwise, literally. In an odd way, atheists need the religious fundamentalist, the person who thinks Adam and Eve really existed and Noah’s Ark was really built. Atheists know how to counter factual claims, and thus take comfort in easily uncovering the meaning of a text upon its first reading. This is why atheists discount religious texts which have inherent contradictions or are as vague as horoscopes in supplying wisdom. Atheists must realize that religion for many, but of course not all, is an emotional connection with others, a sense of comfort, and something which many believers are fine with not analyzing line-by-line. All the Muslims that I have met, similar to any other religious group, simply want to be good people and to have those they respect view them as such. To the extent that religion is involved in that, which varies greatly, they are religious.

Secularism, especially coupled with humanism, offers a strong alternative to religion as how people see the universe and reality. However, when criticizing religion, atheists must be diligent in crafting arguments. Making shallow statements about the blood on the hands of religion or launching thinly-veiled xenophobic critiques toward Islam will not lead to apostasy, but will encourage Muslims and others to do what all humans do when their identity is being challenged by an outside force: double-down and become stubborn. As is true for much of life, humility and empathy on the part of the religious critic here can go a long way.

The trials of Mohamed Morsi

This was written for Middle East Eye and was originally published here.


The postponed and pending trials of former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi have punctuated the news coming from Egypt in 2014. But below the transparent cover of legal procedure lies the base political desires of the judiciary: to marginalize and eliminate the defiant Muslim Brotherhood from Egyptian political life.

On 3 July 2013 Mohamed Morsi was removed as President of Egypt. Shortly thereafter, the new interim government detained him; he has been in the custody of the Egyptian state ever since. Later in 2013 the government began to level a series of charges against Morsi, leading to a string of various trials which can best be characterized by Morsi’s defiance to recognize the court as legitimate and the frequent postponements.

Here is a short update as to the status of the trials of Mohamed Morsi. He faces:

• A trial for espionage, which includes a total of 36 defendants. Most recently, it was postponed earlier this month and will resume on 14 September, at which time media will be allowed to cover the proceedings. The charge alleges the senior leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood conspired with foreign organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah regarding terrorist activity within Egypt;
• A trial regarding the charges faced with respect to Morsi’s 2011 escape from prison. On 18 August the case was postponed to 23 August, and then was postponed again until 15 September. An additional 130 defendants await that trial date;
• A trial for the charge of inciting murder, postponed to 11 October. That trial includes 14 other defendants and is regarding the deadly protests in late 2012 outside the Ittihadeya presidential palace; and
• Two other charges: insulting the judiciary and economic fraud. Dates are not presently associated with the potential trials originating from these charges.

The noted frequent delays have been most often due to the availability of witnesses or due to the wishes of attorneys involved for the purposes of preparation.

It must be stated unequivocally: these trials are political. This past year has left little doubt that the Egyptian judiciary has become a political actor, and there is no reason to view these Morsi trials as in any way above the political fray. Egypt’s judiciary has not only tried hundreds of defendants at once during trials lasting only a few hours with no procedural protections, but has upheld many of the resulting convictions. 

The charges against Morsi range from the possibly sound pending the evidence presented (inciting murder against protesters at Ittihadeya, escaping from prison), to the incredibly weak (insulting the judiciary), to the fanciful (conspiring with Hezbollah to commit terrorism). 

The legal merit to these charges under existing Egyptian law at the times of commission will have little to no influence on the outcomes of the trials themselves. Ironically, last October I wrote about Morsi’s potential legal liability under Egyptian and international law regarding the death of four Shia shortly after he spoke nearby in the presence of rather explicit anti-Shia hate speech. That is not among one of the charges here, however. While that case would by no means be a ‘slam dunk’, it stands on more firm legal ground than several of the charges Morsi faces presently.

If the judiciary wishes for the law, and therefore their decisions, to give behavioral guidance to Egyptians and be respected by Egyptians, they must have judicial consistency - or at least provide legally defensible arguments therefor. No reconciliation has been made between the hundreds of death sentences handed down after a few hours of trial and a few dozen charges of insulting the judiciary requiring months of delay occurring within the same legal system and under the same laws. It is clear, then, that the structural health of the judiciary or the legitimacy of Egypt's greater legal system is not the primary concern with respect to these trials.

Viewing the subject more broadly, the trials of both former Egyptian presidents Hosni Mubarak and now Mohamed Morsi represent an ad hoc and ill-conceived version of transitional justice. Each deposed president has been strung along after many delays and multiple charges which are often peripheral to why they were so despised. This is either the result of an attempt to take extreme procedural care when trying a former head of state or a desire to neuter their respective followings by continually placing both men in the public consciousness as merely medium-level criminals, while also being careful not to create new martyrs. 

Regardless of the intention, the approach is ineffective. Those who support Morsi will clearly not disappear as a result of court verdicts, and those who were felool (derogatory term relating to the old regime) with respect to Mubarak’s government have already done their damage by continuing to occupy the machinery of the state to this day. Instead, these drawn-out trials, juxtaposed with the blistering speed of the trials of low-level Muslim Brotherhood supporters, merely give the impression that the judiciary does what serves its own political ends.

The immediate results of the charges against Morsi will follow the political prudence of the judiciary: the trials will be postponed when beneficial, the charges dropped when needed, and the defendant convicted when desired. 

As always, unfortunately, the real victims of the Morsi trials are the Egyptian people. While ideal transitional justice mechanisms remain unlikely to surface in Egypt in the foreseeable future, Morsi’s treatment by a demonstrably biased institution serves only to further polarize, not heal, a public in desperate need for moderate politics. This past year has given no evidence to even the most optimistic observer that the judiciary in Egypt can be a properly principled institution which can be so crucial to a democratic transition.